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1. Introduction: Reforming public management and law?  
1.1 Background and research question 
The public sectors in many EU countries have undergone huge reforms during the last 25 
years. These changes are largely connected to the global trend of New Public Management 
(“NPM”). NPM consists of ideas which evolve around the notion of making government 
more efficient. Based on these ideas certain policy suggestions have been made which with 
the onus of achieving this goal. Academically, a great deal of research has been made into 
the subject of the ideas behind NPM, criticism towards it, and the effects of its 
implementation. In EU law the concept of services of general interest have increased in 
importance since the 2003 Altmark ruling concerning the financing of the compensation of 
the provision of services of general economic interests and the 2009 BUPA ruling. This 
relatively new case law on has made the Member States review the way they finance 
certain functions they consider to be in the public interest which are undertaken by 
undertakings. Services of general economic interest relate closely to the functions which 
states have the responsibility to provide and therefor it relates to the regulation of the 
public sector. In this context it becomes interesting to ask about the relationship between 
NPM and the law. Specifically, it becomes interesting to ask about the relationship 
between NPM and the law affecting the regulation of the public sector.  
In this thesis I therefore set out to research the relationship between NPM and services of 
general economic interest in the context of state aid. The context of State aid is chosen 
partly to limit the field of research, as SGEIs are also relevant in the field of the 
fundamental freedoms as well, and partly because the recent development in case law has 
taken place in this field.  
Further, if there is a relationship between the two, then what is the nature of this 
relationship? Has the NPM somehow affected and shaped the way the EU courts view the 
public sector through the field of services in the general economic interest? The way I will 
go about this research task is by first researching the topic of New Public Management. 
Chapter two and three focus on NPM and contain the historical origins, the ideology 
behind it which has shaped it as well as the policy suggestions stemming from it and how 
they have been implemented. Chapter five focuses on the treatment of public services in 
EU law and the legal basis for services in the general economic interest. Chapter six 
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reviews the case law based on Article 106(2) TFEU and the requirements for applying it 
and its role as an exception. Chapter six sets out in a brief way the foundations of EU State 
aid law and the test for qualifying State aid. In chapter seven I focus on the financing of 
services of general economic interest and review the important cases such as Altmark, 
BUPA, Chronopost and others. In chapter eight I analyse the relationship between services 
of general economic interests. This thesis will focus primarily on the case law of the 
General Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union. The state aid decisions by 
the European Commission will be left on the side lines. The reason is that the decisions by 
the Court are more legally significant, and therefore interesting, then the decisions by the 
European Commission. 
1.2 Methodology  
In this master’s thesis I will use information through research obtain in the fields of 
political science and economic and apply it to the case law of the EU courts. I will review 
the research on NPM regarding its history, the ideas behind it based on economic theories 
as well as how NPM ideas have been implemented in practise. Using the results I get from 
this review I will apply these finding to the law in the field of SGEIs in a state aid context. 
By studying the case law of the European courts and by reviewing the existing legal 
literature I will try to set out any the elements of any possible relationship between NPM 
and SGEIS in a State aid context. 
 For this part of my thesis I will use a dogmatic method. In other words, I will review case 
law and legal literature on the subject to get a picture of the development of this field of 
law and where the current law stands. Having come to a conclusion regarding the 
development of the law I will attempt to review whether there is a connection between 
NPM and SGEIs. As the case law of the EU courts are very context bound and sometimes 
rich with information on the background of cases, especially AG opinions, I will use this 
information to try and understand the context. As NPM precedes the recent development in 
financing of SGEIs I hope that the history of NPM will provide me with a background to 
the many of the cases of the court.   
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2. A Global Wave of Administrative Reform: New Public 
Management   
2.1 Where did it come from? 
2.1.1 The nature of public management reform  
New Public Management (“NPM”) is a wave of administrative reforms undertaken 
globally, under the last 25 years, which has affected the public sectors of many countries.
1
 
The goals of most NPM reforms has been to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the public sector; to enhance the responsiveness of public agencies to their clients and 
customers; to reduce public expenditure; and to improve managerial accountability.
2
 This 
was undertaken by “doing away with hierarchy, monolithic systems, politically neutral 
administrative bodies, standardized personnel system and standardized regulation of 
citizens and companies for the benefit of a market-like, deregulated system of pseudo-
corporate, autonomous service providers and enthusiastic public managers.”3 NPM was a 
part of a new “time spirit” which in the words of Jorgensen and Andersen “changed [the] 
perception of humankind.
4
 In the authors’ view neo-liberalism provided NPM development 
with an ideological soundboard which favoured values such as freedom of choice and 
individual in contrast to collective solutions and solidarity but in accordance with the 
rational choice model.
5
 NPM reforms can also be described as not making a distinction 
between the public and the private sector when it comes to how the public sector is 
managed; separating commercial activity from non-commercial activity and emphasizing 
financial reporting and accountability
6
.  
Christensen and Laegried write that NPM puts economic values foremost and that other 
broader political concerns thereby become subordinated to economic values. NPM is 
focused is concerned with management and it assumes that management is generic and that 
all managers faces the same problems irrespective of their environment. NPM contains a 
                                                 
1
 Tom Christensen and Per Laegreid (eds.): The Ashgate Research Compnion to New Public Management, 
Surrey 2011, Ashgate, p. 1. 
2
 Ibid.  
3
 Torben Beck Jorgensen and Lotte Bogh Andersen: An Afternath of NPM: Regained Relevance of Public 
Values and Public Service Motivation in Tom Christensen and Per Laegreid (eds.): The Ashgate Research 
Compnion to New Public Management, Surrey 2011, Ashgate, p. 335.  
4
 Jorgensen and Andersen 2011, p. 355.  
5
 Ibid.  
6
 Zahirul Hoque and Jodie Moll: Public Sector Reform: Implications for Accounting, Accountability and 
Performance of State– Owned Entities – An Australian Perspective. International Journal of Public Sector 
Managmement, vol. 14, no. 4 (2001), p. 305.   
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tension as it holds that there is a need for both more managerial independence and for more 
political accountability. NPM has focused on strengthening certain concepts and values by 
at the expense of certain old public management values. Managerial accountability, based 
on output, competition, transparency and contractual relations have been strengthened, 
whereas accountability were based on input processes and procedures, hierarchical control, 
legality, trust, and cultural traditions have been weakened. The authors write that NPM is 
customer-driven believes that the customer is potentially able to shape policy. What NPM 
is less interested in is the influence on public bodies through the means of elections and the 
influence of public bodies as consumers. Christensen and Laegried argue that NPM is 
concerned with efficiency, quality and direct influence and less with democracy.
7
  
In order to explain what New Public management is will look at the historical roots of 
NPM, the ideas behind NPM and some common traits behind NPM reforms. This process 
is made difficult by the fact that these three different questions are not easy to keep apart. 
The overarching question that these sub-questions attempt to answer is the question of 
what NPM is. Separating the “historical” origins from the “theoretical” origins might 
deviate from how reforms progress in reality. In addition to being the result of a set of 
ideas, NPM was the result of political, economic, social and technological forces.
8
  In 
addition to this, NPM reforms have always been constrained by local circumstances, so 
called path dependency.
9
 Therefore no meaning should be read into the division between 
ideas and history. However, for the sake of simplicity this chapter is divided as to separate 
these two aspects of NPM.  
 
Gruening presents two hypotheses about NPM. He claims that decisions on how public 
administration shall be constructed are closely related to politics.
10
 Further he hypothesises 
that NPM is a mix of values seem to offer a solution to certain problems, but that it will not 
last forever.
11
    Hood, Pollitt and Aucoin are the perhaps most cited authors on the traits of 
NPM. According to Hood the focus of the NPM movement “was ﬁrmly managerial in the 
                                                 
7
 Tom Christensen and Per Laegried: Democracy and Administrative Policy: Contrasting Elements of New 
Public Management (NPM) and Post– NPM, European Political Science Review, vol. 3 no .1 (2011), pp. 125 
– 146, p. 131– 132. The entire paragraph is cites the two pages mentioned.    
8
 Jonathan Boston: Basic NPM Ideas and their Development in Tom Christensen and Per Laegreid (eds.): 
The Ashgate Research Companion to New Public Management, Surrey 2011, Ashgate, p. 18.  
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Gernod Gruening: Origin and theoretical basis of New Public Management, International Public 
Management Journal 4:2001, p. 20.  
11
 Ibid.  
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sense that it stressed the diﬀerence management could and should make to the quality and 
eﬃciency of public services. Its focus on public service production functions and 
operational issues contrasted with the focus on public accountability, ‘model employer’ 
public service values, ‘due process,’ and what happens inside public organizations in 
conventional public administration.”12 Aucoin13, who is commonly cited14, summarized the 
central doctrine as being a mix of ideas relating to corporate management, institutional 
economics or public choice. There is however a tension between these ideas since the aims 
of the ideas differs between each other.
15
  
2.1.2 NPM as a word, social movement and science 
Christopher Hood describes the development of NPM in its relation to other concepts. He 
studies public management as a social movement and public management developed as a 
science.  Instead, Hood defines public management.
16
 The definition rests on a three pillar 
foundation; public management as a word; as a movement; and as a science. Management 
as a word seem to have come into the English language in the sixteenth century, from the 
Italian word maneggiare, training or riding a horse with skill.
17
 Before its contemporary 
use, describing business administration, it was used to describe the conduct of public 
affairs and war in the eighteenth century.
18
 However, it is hard to pinpoint the origins of 
the modern public management tradition.
19
 In the nineteenth century the word 
“administration” was adopted in the English-speaking world (“to serve”).20 Hood writes 
that “’administration may have been favoured because in an age of democratization, rule-
of-law constitutionalism and developing parliamentary government, it better conveyed the 
notion of subordination to constitutional authority and rule-governed institutional activity 
than the word drawn from the half-dead horse-mastering metaphor”21. In the late 
                                                 
12
 Ibid para. 11.  
13
 Peter Aucoin: Administrative Reform in Public Management: Paradigms, Principles, Paradoxes and 
Pendulums, Governance, vol. 3, no. 2 (1990). 
14
 Hood 2001, p. 12554.   
15
 Hood 2001, p. 12554.  
16
 Christopher Hood: Public Management – The Word, The Movement, The Science in Ewan Ferlie, 
Laurence E. Lynn Jr. and Christopher Pollitt (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Public Management, Oxford 
2005, Oxford University Press, pp. 7 – 27.  
17
 Hood 2005, p. 8.  
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Hood 2005, p. 9.  
20
 Ibid.  
21
 Hood 2005, p. 10.  
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nineteenth century “administration became the most widely used term for the academic 
study of the executive branch in the English-speaking world.
22
  
The term management did not disappear completely and was used in the US by the 
progressive modern managerial movement.
23
 The movement advocated for professional 
conduct free of political intervention based on pre-set guidelines and an understanding of 
good practice.
24
 Management ideas were still applied to public policy after WWII.
25
   
When the term “public management” was introduced as an academic subject at American 
universities in the 1960’s and 70’s the term was made known in by its contemporary use 
and created an academic movement. Hood writes that the movement distinguished itself 
from previous schools of public administration, and by the 1980’s the term public 
management had become indicative of both an activity and a field of study.
26
 The 
distinction, however, between public management, public administration and general 
management was according to Wood difficult to find.
27
  
By being part of names of schools, courses, journal, books and conferences public 
management as a term became institutionalized, as had its predecessors become. In the 
1980’s public management became a fashionable term to use by official bodies both 
nationally and internationally.
28
 The 1984 New Zealand government document 
“Government Management” signified a landmark for NPM, containing ideas drawn from 
institutional economics and the application of ideas drawn from business management to 
public management and was the start of a massive outflow of official documents both 
academic and official using the term.
29
 In the beginning of the 1990’s the term Public 
Management partially lost ground to so called “Third Way” at least in the terminology of 
such bodies as the OECD and the World Bank.
30
 The term governance emerged, which 
Hood calls, commenting on the Greek origins of the term, “[…] another half-dead 
                                                 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Ibid.  
24
 Ibid.  
25
 Ibid.  
26
 Hood 2005, p. 11.  
27
 Ibid.  
28
 Ibid.  
29
 Ibid.  
30
 Ibid.  
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metaphor”.31 “Governance” has increased its popularity but public management has 
remained well-established.
32
  
Commenting on the two arguments that a change in terminology has few connections to 
actual change, and that new terminology is only a way to covertly operate politically, Hood 
asserts that there is some truth to the both. NPM contains elements which are not new and 
international bodies such as the World Bank the Asian Development Bank, which are 
banned from participating in politics, might have used the “neutral” language of NPM in 
order to implement certain policies.
33
 Hood argues that that terminological change is part 
of an analytical and ideological change.
34
 In government and bureaucracy the struggle for 
power over terminology is central, and linguistic change takes place for a reason, reflecting 
a struggle for power.
35
 
In contemporary public management, Hood finds the characteristics of a social movement, 
part of a broader “managerial” movement.36 Social movements develop in opposition to 
one or more established movements, which in turns attracts opposition to it, is 
representative of variety of interests and interests, and manifests a worldview and a style of 
rhetoric.
37
 Of NPM in the 1980’s and 1990’s Hood writes that “the […] movement […] 
was a reaction against those in public law public administration who put the focus on 
constitutional and institutional design of the machinery of government. It stressed 
production engineering and managerial leadership, rather than rule-bound bureaucracy, as 
the essence of executive government.
38
 
Turing to public management as a science, Hood writes that there is no consensus on what 
the subject of study is. Hood writes that in order for a field to be considered a science, its 
researchers must engage in three types of activities.
39
 The first one is descriptive and aims 
at describing and characterizing the work it is describing. An important task is the analysis 
and conceptualizing of institutional developments, and in the beginning of the 1990’s 
                                                 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Ibid.  
33
 Ibid. 
34
 Hood 2005, p. 12. 
35
 Ibid.  
36
 Hood 2005, p. 13.  
37
 Ibid.  
38
 Hood 2005, p. 14.  
39
 Hood 2005, p. 20. 
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researchers such as Hood, Flynn and Pollitt undertook this type of work.
40
 The second 
characteristic Hood brings up is the systematic collection of data. This type of research has 
been undertaken by among others Aucoin, and Pollitt and Bouckert.
41
 They undertook 
research analysing the effects of NPM reforms in different countries.
42
 The third 
characteristic Hood mentions is the identification of anomalies, surprises and counter-
intuitive observations.
43
 Authors like Christensen and Laegried and Peters have focused on 
this area.
44
 Gregory identified the identified the “production paradox” which that applying 
the “production approach” into realms in areas in which results are not easily measurable 
will cause unintended effects, including the blurring of management’s responsibility.45 
Another important paradox which has been showed by many authors is the so called 
Tocuevillian paradox. This paradox holds that some NPM reforms intended to be 
deregulatory actually lead to more regulation and oversight.
46
       
2.1.3 Economic crisis and neo-liberalism           
The origins in Europe of NPM were less related to academic trends and more related to 
politics and the economic crisis in the 1970’s.47 Sahlin writes that the crisis lead to the 
questing of the public sectors in many Western countries, especially the ones with fiscal 
problems, and those countries turned to other societal sectors for experiences and models 
to imitate.
48
 According to Lynn the economic crisis affected the development of new 
reform ideas regarding the public sector, and also issues such as managing the post-war 
welfare state.
49
 In relation to the economic crisis Toonen agrees with Sahlin and Lynn in 
that NPM can “commonly [be] understood as a reaction against a perceived economic 
threat”50. While Wood states NPM can be described as a policy response to economic 
                                                 
40
 Hood 2005, p. 21.  
41
 Hood 2005, p. 22.  
42
 Ibid.  
43
 Ibid. 
44
 Ibid. 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 Ibid. 
47
 Laurence E. Lynn: A Concise History of the Field in Ewan Ferlie, Laurence E. Lynn Jr. and Christopher 
Pollitt (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Public Management, Oxford 2005, Oxford University Press, p. 42. 
48
 Kerstin Sahlin– Andersson: National, International and Transnational Constructions of New Public 
Management in Tom Christensen and Per Laegreid (eds.): New Public Management: The Transformation of 
Ideas and Practice, London 2001, Ashgate. p. 49.  
49
 Lynn 2006, p. 114.  
50
 Theo Toonen: The Comparative Dimension of Administrative Reform: Creating Open Villages and 
Redesigning the Politics of Administration in Christopher Pollitt and Colin Talbot (eds.): Unbundled 
Government: A Critical Analysis of the Global Trend to Agencies, Quangos and Contractualisation, New 
York 2004, Routledge, p. 188.   
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crises, it is equally an embodiment of the increasing influence of neo-liberalism.
51
 Lane 
acknowledges that the “radical nature of NPM may have served well the politics of the 
new right or neo-conservatism in the 1980s and the resurgence of neo-liberalism in a 
globalised world economy in the 1990s” 52.  Simultaneously, authors such as Friedman and 
Hayek brought fourth neoliberal ideas.
53
  Some authors directly relate NPM to neo-
liberalism, even going as far as claiming that NPM is often used as a positive term for neo-
liberal reforms in the public sector.
54
 However, this view is disputed by others.
55
 The 
opposing argument is that NPM reforms have been adopted by centre-left governments as 
well.
56
.  
The rise of neo-liberalism can be attributed to various social, economic and political 
reasons. The so called stagflation in many OECD countries of the 1970’s was one of them. 
There was a perception that Keynesian policies had failed in delivering growth and low 
inflation. Furthermore, there were worries about the perceived expansion of the public 
sector and its effect on deficits and an expanding bureaucracy.  The perception was that 
expanding social programs failed in their missions of facilitating social mobility. Instead 
they created disincentives. Additionally there was evidence of poorly designed regulatory 
measures resulting in economic inefficiencies causing compliance costs. The solution was 
provided by neo-liberalism, a doctrine for a shrinking state and expanding markets. The 
recipe was one of greater fiscal discipline, a reduction in scale and scope of government 
activities, more “targeted” welfare programmes, a broadening of the tax base and cutting of 
marginal tax rates, the introduction of competition through liberalization and privatization, 
and the elimination of subsidies to commercial activities, abandonment of Keynesian 
demand-side economic policy and deregulation of worker protection.
57
  
The main neo-liberal policy advise that was offered to the field of public management 
consisted of components such as privatization of state enterprises, the separation of 
commercial and non-commercial activities, where commercial activities are subject to 
                                                 
51
 Geoffrey Wood: New Public Management and Europeanisation: Convergence or ‘Nestedness’? in Pauline 
Dibben, Geoffrey Wood and Ian Roper (eds.): Contesting Public Sector Reforms, London 2004, Palgrave 
Macmillan, p. 167.  
52
 Jan– Erik Lane: New Public Management, London 2000, Routledge, p. 3.  
53
 Boston 2011, p. 18.  
54
 Dibben and Higgins: New Public Management: Marketisation, Managerialism and Consumerism in in 
Pauline Dibben, Geoffrey Wood and Ian Roper (eds.): Contesting Public Sector Reforms, London 2004, 
Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 26 – 37, p. 35.    
55
 See Lane 2000, p. 7.  
56
 Christopher Pollitt: The Essential Public Manager, Berkshire 2003, Open University Press, p. 36.  
57
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competition from the market and where possible non-commercial agencies subject to 
competitive pressure, a stricter control of spending and an extension of management 
freedoms and a greater transparency and accountability for financial management. The 
policy recommendations were the basis of such NPM ideas as commercialization, 
corporatization, privatization, and budget cuts. Neo-liberalism was however not the only 
source of NPM.
58
             
Politicians like Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan and the 1984 New Zealand Labour 
government, who pioneered NPM reforms were all inspired by neo-liberalism.
59
 These 
politicians and their advisors advocated what in their minds was a more “business-like 
approach”.60 These were the first governments to adopt NPM reforms well as local 
governments in the US.
61
 The early adopters had suffered the most suffered the most from 
the economic crisis of the 1970’s. 
New Zealand and Australia later followed suit, followed by most of the members of the 
OECD countries.
62
 In addition to certain countries embracing neo-liberalism, international 
organizations such as the IMF, the OECD, and the World Bank embraced these ideas. 
These institutions became powerful advocates of NPM ideas.
63
 The Public Management 
Committee of the OECD also played an important role in spreading this message.
64
   
According to Pollitt “[g]radually, partly through doctrine and partly through trial and error, 
[the business-like approach became a] more specific set of recipes for public sector 
reform”.65 In the beginning of the 1990’s a few influential commentators, with Hood 
coining the concept New Public Management
66
, began spreading the message that this was 
part of a global trend with similar traits. In their influential work Reinventing Government, 
Osborne and Gaebler described what they called the entrepreneurial movement as global 
and “inevitable”.67 Today, however, as Pollitt and Bouckert have shown, NPM reforms 
have shown considerable difference throughout the world depending on the country and 
                                                 
58
 The entire paragraph is a citation of Boston 2011, p. 18 – 19.  
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local political, economic and cultural context in which they have been implemented.
68
 
NPM is not coherent and consistent, and there is no “official” programme of reform.69 
Reform in the public sector can however be defined as a global trend.
70
 
3. NPM in theory and in practise 
3.1 Ideology 
3.1.1 A mixture of ideas  
NPM is neither made up of one unified theory, nor is it a random set of ideas about public 
management. Instead, it “embodies a particular kind of administrative argument based on 
upon specific doctrines and related justifications
71
.”  Because of the diverse intellectual 
origins of NPM and the different settings it has found a home in NPM comes in many 
different forms, additionally, NPM was more driven by practitioners than by theory.
72
  
Being aware of the theories behind NPM is vital, because, as Pollitt writes, the strength of 
the NPM will partly be dependent on whether the underlying theories are correct or not.
73
 
As it has turned out, some of these theories might be partially or wholly incorrect, such as 
schemes of performance related pay in the public sector, which has failed to produce the 
desired outcome of more efficient workers in the public sector.
74
  
Another aspect that is interesting in NPM is that underlying theories exhibit tension 
between one another. There is inherent tension in NPM between its two main theoretical 
fundaments, economics and managerialism.
75
 These tensions related to the underlying 
assumptions of individual behaviour. Whereas public choice base models of NPM reform 
view individuals as utility-maximising and selfish, and expresses a low trust view of 
individuals, modern management theory has a more optimistic view of individuals 
permitting more freedom to manage.
76
          
                                                 
68
 Christopher Pollitt and Geert Bouckaert: Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis (2
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edition), Oxford 2011, Oxford University Press.   
69
 Sahlin– Andersson 2001, p. 51. 
70
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71
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As opposed that what thoughts its name might awake many of the theoretical foundations 
of NPM are not “new” but have existed in earlier administration theory.77 However, 
although some of the individual characteristics of NPM are not new, and could in fact be 
considered old, they have never been organized into a reform movement before.
78
  
Gruening states that NPM is a mixture of ideas drawn from such theories as public choice, 
management theory, classic public administration, policy analysis, principal-agent theory, 
property rights theory, the Neo-Austrian School, transaction cost economics and New 
Public Administration.
79
 Groot and Budding further group Gruening’s findings on the 
theoretical basis of NPM into three categories.
80
 These are neo-classical public 
administration and management, management sciences and new institutional economics.
81
 
The first group is focused on the organization of the state and the application of scientific 
principles to governing.
82
 The second one focuses on introducing ideas from business and 
management into public service, whereas the third one views public servants as persons 
who are concerned with maximising their personal utility.
83
 
Groot and Budding write that these orientations introduce different themes into NPM 
inspired reforms.
84
 Depending on the country and the specific problems it faces, the 
different orientations of NPM will be used as sources for solutions to national problems.
85
 
Boston further adds to the list of influences neo-liberalism and law and economics.
86
 
Whereas it might be easy to identify the ideas on which NPM is based, it is more difficult 
to assess the impact of them on NPM, either in a certain jurisdiction or generally.
87
 
According to Lähdesmäki NPM’s theoretical basis is scientific management, public choice 
theory and managerialism
88
. These two ideological currents of managerialism are partly in 
conflict and their emphasis can differ from country to country in which NPM reforms have 
been undertaken. It might seem that the idea of the leader of a public body as a CEO is in 
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conflict with the NPM aim of increased political control.  Even supporters of NPM reforms 
admit that the theoretical background contains potential conflicts and that it remains to be 
seen how these conflicts will play out in reality.
89
 Lähdesmäki writes that “the central 
demand and message of public choice to NPM is the decrease in size of the public sector. 
The role of the public sector ought to be ‘back-stage’ from which it is hoped that the public 
sector will withdraw from service production.”90  
NPM’s managerialist approach provides a solution to the problem of management of the 
public sector by using private sector management models and techniques. However, it does 
not give a clear answer as to what these could be.
91
 Although the NPM discourse talks 
about “the private sector model” as one distinguishable model, it is hard to pinpoint one 
single specific model. 
92
         
Reforms based on NPM ideas have globally changed the structure of government 
organizations in a significant way.
93
 In the words of Grossi and Reichard: “[t]he State – at 
least to some extent – has moved from a monopolist producer of public services to the 
guarantor, enabler, co-ordinator and moderator of a complex institutional (or ‘governance’) 
setting of public service providers. We observe new, more complex and diversified 
patterns of service delivery, ranging from public administrations and public enterprises via 
mixed public/private organizations to private business or not-for-profit institutions.” 
3.1.2 The ideas explained 
3.1.2.1 Managerialism 
The origins of the managerialist movement can be found in the 1880’s. The movement was 
pioneered by Frederick Taylor. In. Managerialism contains four specific features which 
have become central to NPM.  The first one is that management is generic, meaning that 
the same type of management can be applied to any type of organization regardless of its 
status. This indicates that the same the same types of management techniques and 
measures can be used in any type of organisation. A second feature of managerialism is the 
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idea that managers should be given the authority and discretion in managing, by having 
power over budgets. The discretion is however restricted to a context in which clearly 
specific outcomes are set up, there are strong incentives for performance, monitoring and 
hierarchical control.
94
 The ability to manage requires room for the manager to manoeuvre, 
which is materialized through the “right to manage” slogan.95 
An underlying assumption of managerialism is that individuals respond well to rewards 
and sanctions and those incentives can drive up efficiency. Performance-based pay and 
performance linked contracts. The incentives are financial as it is assumed that individuals 
are most responsive to such incentives. As a final aspect managerialism places a value on 
the idea that all tasks in any organization can be defined measured. This is executed in the 
name of efficiency, cost-effectiveness and accountability. A substantial portion of NPM 
can be attributed to managerialism, at least in part.
 96
 Managerialism advocates private over 
public organisations and single purpose over multipurpose.
97
   
Pollitt’s definition of managerialism is the idea that the management style of the private 
sector is the most effective management style and should be applied to the public sector. 
Specifically the public sector should strive towards a continuous productivity increase, the 
measurement of results and performance, a system which rewards that which is regarded as 
performance and the allocation of resources according to results. The success of the 
organization will dependent on the management skills of its leader.
98 
In managerialism the 
value of leadership itself is placed high. Managerialism will enable bureaucratic 
organisations to increase their capacity through improvements in management. This will be 
accomplished through the dismantling of bureaucracy. The organisation should focus on its 
core task, its personnel and its clients.
99
 
3.1.2.2 Public Choice 
Boston writes that “public choice theory has had a profound impact in the disciplines of 
economics and political science since the 1960’s, and has influenced policy formulation in 
many jurisdictions across numerous policy domains, including constitutional and 
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institutional design, regulatory policy and public management.
100
 It was with NPM that the 
theory of public choice was implemented on a large scale
101
 Niskanen’s contribution to 
applied public choice in government is that public servants aim to increasing their budgets 
in order to achieve certain personal aims they value.
102
  
The assumption made by public choice theory is that human behaviour is dominated by 
self-interest. This does not mean that humans are necessarily selfish, however, when there 
is a situation of conflict interests human will put their personal interest first and pursue 
them in the most efficient manner. This assumption is the basis for how public choice 
theorists view individuals’ actions within an organisation. William Niskanen was an 
influential author in the field.
103
 This image of public servants shaped the public perception 
of the public sector, although there is limited empirical support for the claims made by 
Niskanen.
104
 Public choice theorists have however mostly been focused avoiding that 
politician’s favour narrow and short term special interests. The perceived risk was that 
unless this behaviour of favouring certain lobbies could be controlled it would lead to an 
ever expanding, inefficient state.
105
 
The solution offered by public choice theory, or as Abernach and Christensen categorize it, 
new institutional economics, is the alignment of the interests of the individuals with the 
organization. Successful institutions will find ways to channel the self-interest into 
working towards the aims of the leaders of the organization whereas unsuccessful 
organizations will fail at this and the actions of the individuals will not be channelled 
towards the aims of the leaders.
106
 
On the basis of this assumption certain policy suggestions are made. The idea is to 
implement changes that will enable a system of reward and punishment for “selfish” 
individuals doing the right thing. Contracts are favoured because specific aims can be set 
up through and the fulfilment of these aims can be monitored. Reward or punishment can 
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the given. Privatization is favoured because it is assumed that private companies are not as 
easily affected by competing interest groups as public organizations and that private 
companies are able to better reward employees than public sector organizations are. 
Competition is favoured in order motivate individuals to strive for the aims of the 
organization set by the leaders because of the fear of losing.
107
 
According to  Lähdesmäki “[p]ublic choice created the impression that bureaucrats aim at 
increasing their budgets and increasing personal utility. Public spending has increased and 
the politicians have lost control of the economy and the public servants, which they control 
and govern.” The response was according to Lähdesmäki to increase political control of the 
public sector.
108
 There was a perceived need to control the supposedly wasteful spending 
of the public sector. The solution was found in managerialism. The private sector provided 
the model of a strong CEO-like leader to guide the public body as a corporation.
109
  
3.1.2.3 Agency theory 
Agency theory has influenced fields such as economics, accounting, management political 
science and sociology since the 1970’s. As with most social science theories its validity 
remains disputed. Agency theory’s focus is on the relationship between the agency and the 
principal in which one party (the principal) delegates tasks to another party (agent). This 
relationship is used through the metaphor of contract. Contracts in agency theory are 
interpreted broadly and can both refer to a formal, written contract and an implicit, non-
formal contract. The second type of contract cannot be legally enforced and they therefor 
depend on the goodwill and commitment of both parties. Departing in problems with 
control in firms, the application of agency theory soon spread to other areas such as public 
management. The questions in agency theory are focused on is how to best construct, 
monitor and enforce contracts.
110
  
There are certain problems that arise in principal-agent relationships. Discrepancies in the 
goals of the principal and the agent may arise. Conflicts in the instruments needed to 
achieve the goal of the principal in the most efficient way are can pose problems, which 
require long-term contracts. Monitoring agents can be difficult and principals and agents 
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may have different attitudes to risk taking. The scale of the problems that might arise 
depends on the assumptions made regarding the drivers of human behaviour and the 
context of the agency relationship. Like public choice theory, agency theory assumes that 
individuals are rational, self-interested, with the intent of maximizing value. Opportunistic 
behaviour on both sides will create problems, as well as asymmetric availability of 
information between the parties.
111
 
Adverse selection and moral hazard are concepts that interests agency theorists. Problems 
might arise in pre-contractual situations where information the agent does not disclose 
information on the agent’s skills and knowledge required fulfilling the obligations of a 
contract, or the information is not readily available to the principal. This might lead to 
adverse selection by the principal. A problem with moral hazard may appear when the 
principal is able to monitor some but not all of the activities of the agent. The agent might 
be tempted not to perform equally well in all situations.
112
  
Agency theory addresses how to best negotiate, specify and monitor contracts within the 
described context. Principals have three different options as to address these problems. The 
principal may try to align the interests of the parties by incentives, use monitoring, or 
negotiate an agreement where the agent is bound to the interest of the principal or pay 
compensation the obligations are not met. The costs that arise from failure to make the 
agent act in the interest of the principal are called agency costs. Agency theory focuses on 
minimizing these costs by designing contracts. There are outcome-oriented contracts and 
behaviour-oriented contracts. The first relate to market governance structures, performance 
based remuneration and the transfer of property rights. The second one relates to 
hierarchical governance arrangements, salaried employments and career structures. When 
results are easily specified and monitored, and the contract can be enforced easily, 
outcome-based contracts are suitable. In other situations behaviour-orientated contracts 
may be more suitable. According to agency theory contracting out may be the best option 
when the circumstances of the first contract type are at hand whereas in-house production 
is more favourable in the second situation. 
113
 
Agency theory’s contributions to NPM have been especially significant for inspiring and 
justifying reforms such as corporatization and privatization as well as governance 
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arrangements for state-owned enterprises. Regarding the organizational design of the core 
public sector agency theory contributed to ideas of how the relationship between policy 
advice and service provision should be arranged. This was a part reason to the 
establishment of semi-competing, publicly-owned service providers in health care and 
research and development in NPM-pioneering New Zealand. Beyond New Zealand the 
effect was less direct. However, as many reforms were copied by other countries the effect 
was indirect.  
3.1.2.4 Transaction cost economics 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) focuses on the design of optimal governance structures 
for various kinds of transactions. This includes the best way of organizing the production 
the production and exchange of goods and services, or in other words, whether a good 
should be produced by the public sector unit itself or purchased through public 
procurement. TCE examines and compares the costs of planning, adapting and monitoring 
the completion of tasks. TCE shares the basic assumption of human behaviour with 
Agency Theory but differs in focus. The focus of TCE lies with organizational boundaries. 
The independent variables of TCE are asset specificity, transaction frequency and 
uncertainty with future unexpected costs. 
 An asset, labour, land or capital is specific when it makes a necessary contribution to the 
production of a certain good, and it has no or low alternative value in other use. An 
example is an investment in highly specialized equipment might result in an asset for 
which there is either no or a less productive use. An investment in a specific asset is 
considered a sunk cost. The owner of a specific asset may have an advantage in relation to 
competitors seeking to enter the market who might be deterred because of high entry-
barriers. The occurrence of asset specificity or non-specificity is dependent on the specifics 
of the market in question. When asset specificity is high markets are relatively 
incontestable with high barriers to entry and exit. In markets with low asset specificity the 
opposite is true.
114
 
TCE addresses the problem of small number bargaining which can arise in a market with 
asset specificity. This problem occurs when a supplier gains an asset specific advantage 
from winning a contract. This can relate to a unique location or skills which gives the 
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supplier an advantage over other competitors. When another similar contract is up for 
tender, the amount of bidders might have drastically been reduced because of the 
advantage achieved by the winner of the previous contract. This enables the remaining 
bidders to extract monopoly rents or to reduce quality in order to increase prices.
115
   
Therefore, according to TCE, certain transactions are more suited for market-based 
mechanisms (public procurement) whereas others are more suitable for in-house 
production. Contracting out is the best option when the goods sought after is part of a 
market that is easily contestable, with low transaction costs. Transaction costs are low 
when there is a small number of relatively simple transactions, significant external 
constrains on opportunism and a low risk of adverse selection. Contracting out can be used 
when the contact can be monitored and enforced easily. This requires that quality and 
quantity of the desired goods is easy to specify and measure. Examples are cleaning, 
catering, waste management, and laundry service. In situations where these conditions are 
not present in-house production is optimal. In-house production is adaptable to changing 
circumstances unexpected additional costs as it is not dependent on highly specific 
contractual terms, as with contracting out.  
Problems associated with uncertainty and opportunism can be directly managed through 
traditional hierarchy, long term-relationships, policy learning and step-by-step adaptions to 
the goal of the organisation. Large public organizations may however face other problems 
such as coordination issues, organizational slack, projects expanding beyond their original 
plans and failing internal controls.
116
 
Boston writes that TCE impacted on NPM in three different ways. It provided answers to 
how to best organize the provision of public services (contracting-out through public 
procurement or in-house), and provided an analytical framework for this. Existing 
contracts (not necessarily legally binding contracts) were rearranged in order to improve 
monitoring and enhance specification. This also includes contracting within the public 
sector, or, put differently, the relationship between purchaser and provider within public 
sector organizations. TCE thereby contributed to new types of contracts, or relationships 
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within the public sector. It can also be seen as having given a reason to the limitation of 
contracting-out as some of the more radical branches of NPM advocates.
117
 
3.1.3 The significance of ideas  
The strength and importance of ideological currents that have affected NPM have differed 
from country to country.
118
 The influence of these is not equally strong in all countries and 
other factors have affected the development of NPM.
119
 Boston’s claim is that the survival 
of many NPM reforms shows that there is consistency to the reforms and that they are not 
inherently illogical. He however, admits that the neither inconsistencies between 
managerialism and public choice cannot be disregarded, that NPM advocates sometimes 
use evidence selectively, nor that NPM sometimes produces unintended results. 
Additionally, Boston sees it as a problem that the theories are not applied appropriately. In 
situations where TCE would advocate in-house production, some more radical forms of 
NPM have used contracting-out in situations where the correct conditions are not present, 
which has created problems with specifying and monitoring tasks. Another issue relates to 
the assumptions made regarding principals in Agency Theory. Too little attention is paid to 
the principal and it is often assumed that the principal is automatically competent. 
Opportunism and lack of knowledge among principals can also pose a problem.                                                
In Europe, NPM affected the delivery of public services and the organizations responsible 
for their delivery. The organizations that were affected were the ones whose tasks were 
repetitive, a similar to the tasks of business, or could be made similar to businesses. In 
scholarship NPM researchers have focused on the reform process and on applying the 
public choice theory in practice.
120
 
The reforms in the public sectors can be noticed through a change in language used of the 
public sector. Whereas the formerly the emphasis was on public law and focus on 
procedures and structures, the new language of public administration has become more 
“economic”. Terms used are; markets, customers, transactions, competition, equilibrium 
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and value.
121
 New technical terms include such terms as transaction costs, principal – agent 
models and game theory/collective action.
122
  
There are however problems with this approach. The perhaps most general criticism is that 
individuals do not only act in self-interest. Cultural or moral aims control the actions of 
people in addition to “self-interest”123. As a general criticism of homo economicus Robin 
Molloy argues that humans are affected by factors such as historical context, race, gender, 
age, class, income, education, and geographical location.
124
 Further, it is difficult to set 
aims in a public organisation as the aim might be ambiguous and difficult to measure.
125
 
For the public sector the motive of economic efficiency is rarely the primary objective, but 
comes second to objectives such as equality of access and general equity.
126
 It can also be 
claimed that the nature of the tasks provided by the public sector is service and not to 
achieve an economic gain and that imposing on an organization which bases its operations 
on a notion of service provision the goal of economic gain will only create more 
problems.
127
 
The individual economic model views politicians and bureaucrats with suspicion. 
Politicians are viewed as an obstacle to efficiency as they focus on their own interest of 
being re-elected, instead of focusing on solving actual problems. Inconsistently however, 
the individual economic model also tasks politicians with setting up incentive schemes for 
managers and setting up goals.
128
 Bureaucrats on the other hand are viewed as self-interest 
maximizing individuals who aim at increasing the size of their agency and extend 
programs they administer.
129
  
Another aspect of individual economic thinking is the redefinition of citizenship. Whereas 
citizenship traditionally emphasizes the collective nature of citizenship, the economic 
individual approach views citizens as individuals with a weak connection to other 
individuals. Citizenship gives people rights and obligations. A good citizen is expected to 
participate in elections and public life. The role of the new citizen emphasizes individual 
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rights and choice. It focuses less on the broader political context of citizenship and more on 
the isolated individual. If participating in an election would not further the self-interest of 
the individual, there is no reason for the individual to participate in them.
130
 
Ideas derived from new institutional economics also change the relationship between 
citizens and public authorities. The nature of the relationship emphasized is one of the 
consumer, user, or client and that of a service provider.
131
 If the government is unable to 
secure an individual’s rights the preferred cause of action is bringing an action before a 
court instead of using methods such as the political and administrative process.
132
 The 
public sector is no longer legitimized in its own right as embodiments of the political 
community, but must be legitimated through their efficiency in delivering services.
133
  
Using elections as tools of changing the civil service is seen as inefficient and slow. 
Instead, by changing the role of the citizen to become customer, the citizen will be 
empowered to affect how the public sector is run. The view of the citizen as a consumer 
raises questions of how well this fits the idea democracy. The idea of the citizen as a 
consumer can be considered non-political or even anti-political. It can also be considered 
as furthering the role of democracy and bringing it to a new level that involves more direct 
democracy. Another question raised is whether the shift will increase or decrease 
inequality. Some economist would say that this is an irrelevant question whereas others say 
that it furthers the interest of citizens to define them as consumers. The counter argument is 
that there is a lack of empirical evidence on the presence of a strong consumer interest in 
the public sector. Another point is that the election model with one vote per person is more 
equal that a market-oriented system which creates biases between consumers based on 
their social or political resources.
134
 
3.2 Policy elements  
There has been definitional dispute of the central elements of NPM.
135
 Different scholars 
have listed certain elements which partially deviate from each other.
136
 Hood, claims that 
                                                 
130
 Aberbach and Christesen 2001, p. 503.  
131
 Aberbach and Christesen 2001, p. 503.  
132
 Ibid.  
133
 Ibid. 
134
 Aberbach and Christesen 2001, pp. 503–504.  
135
 Pollitt and Dan 2011, p. 5.  
136
 Christopher Hood: New Public Management, in International Encyclopeadia of Social and Behavioral 
Sciences, Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes (eds.), Oxford 2001, p. 12553.   
23 
 
the reforms that have been undertaken in the name of NPM today differ to such an extent 
from the traits listed by scholars in the beginning of the 1990’s that defining a reform as an 
NPM reform reveals little of the contents of the reform.
 137
 He even goes as far as claiming 
that the use of the term has it has lost its analytical relevance.
138
  
In defining the elements of NPM, many authors have chosen a two-tier system. For their 
meta-study in NPM reform in Europe Pollitt and Dan
139
 lean on the definition developed 
by Dunleavy et al.
140
 Dunleavy et al. define NPM being “a strongly developed and 
coherent theory of managerial change based on importing into the public sector central 
concepts from (relatively) modern business practises and public choice – influenced 
theory”141 Other authors have described NPM in a similar way. Interestingly enough, the 
authors argue that NPM as a set of ideas is intellectually dead.
142
 Dunleavy et. al.
143
 state 
that separate from the scholarly aspects of NPM, reforms inspired by these sets of ideas are 
still actively implemented, and the cognitive element is still very much present.
144
 
According to the authors only a minority of the elements are still actively being 
developed.
145
   
They continue by arguing that that key parts of the reform message of NPM have been 
reversed as they lead to “policy disasters”, and other significant parts have been halted.146 
Reforms enacted in the past based on NPM ideas are extremely difficult to reverse, argue 
the authors.
147
  NPM ideas have become institutionalized are still gaining momentum in 
certain countries such as India, although they perhaps are not known by that name, or 
where the result of an active reform movement.
148
   
Sahlin-Andersson describes it as both a general trend towards changing the style of 
government and administration as well as describing certain reforms carried out.
149
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According to Christensen and Laegreid it can also be understood “as consisting of potential 
inconsistencies, a tension between centralizing and decentralizing economic ideas. It can 
be seen as consisting of more specific instruments and programs, brought in to solve 
problems with old ones”.150 Peter Aucoin writes that NPM compromised “efforts to roll 
back the state through some combination of privatization, downsizing the public service, 
contracting out, deregulation, expenditure reduction, program termination, downsizing the 
public service, and measures to contain pressures on the public purse”151.Dunleavy’s 
definition consists of three main elements
152
:  
“1) Disaggregation—Splitting up large public sector hierarchies in the same way that large 
private corporations earlier moved from U-form to M-form (multifirm) structures; 
achieving wider, flatter hierarchies internally; and respecifying information and managerial 
systems to facilitate this different pattern of control. In the public sector this theme implied 
a strong flexibilization of previous government-wide practices in personnel, IT, 
procurement, and other functions (Barzelay 2000)[
153
], plus the construction of 
management information systems needed to sustain different practices.  
2) Competition—Introducing purchaser/provider separation into public structures so as to 
allow multiple different forms of provision to be developed and to create (more) 
competition among potential providers. Increasing internal use was made of competition 
processes to allocate resources (in place of hierarchical decision making). The ‘‘core’’ 
areas of state administration and public provision were shrunk, and suppliers were 
diversified. 
3) Incentivization—Shifting away from involving managers and staffs and rewarding 
performance in terms of a diffuse public service or professional ethos, and moving instead 
toward a greater emphasis on pecuniary-based, specific performance incentives. In the 
public sector this shift implied a movement ‘‘down grid and down group,’’ in Douglas’s 
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cultural theory terms. Its impact has been particularly marked for professional groups 
(Kirkpatrick, Ackroyd, and Walker 2004) [
154
].”  
 
Disaggregation, competition and incentivization are part of the first tier and are 
overarching ideas which are underpinned by the second tier.
155
 The second tier is made up 
of NPM-badged or incorporated ideas and specific policies which are constantly changing 
and developing NPM.
156
 Changes at this level are primarily driven by the application of 
economics, business and public choice ideas to pragmatic problems in the public sector.
157
 
Focusing on the core NPM reformers
158
, Dunleavy et al write that, the reforms were only 
implemented when they were adapted to seem managerially or legally fit for 
implementation in the public sector.
159
 In their meta-study, Pollitt and Dan add to 
Dunleavy et al’s definition Robert’s two additional elements of NPM. According to 
Roberts NPM reforms have a way of thinking of the organisation of government. These 
reforms view the democratic process with scepticism for being short sited and optimism 
regarding the outcome of removing certain processes from the democratic process
160
. 
In two widely cited articles from 1990 and 1995 Hood listed the central traits of NPM 
reforms.
161
 Hood listed seven distinguishable traits
162
: unbundling public sector into 
corporatized units organized by product, more contract-based competitive provision, with 
internal markets and term contracts, stress on private sector management styles, more 
stress on discipline and frugality in resource use, visible hands-on top management, 
explicit formal measurable standards and measurement of performance and success and 
greater emphasis on output controls 
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The first point implies corporatization leading to separate units as individual cost centres 
with their own organizational identity, either in fact or in law.
163
 The intention of 
corporatization is to increase budgetary and managerial autonomy. 
164
 Competition is to be 
increased between both public sector units as well as between the public and the private 
sector.
165
 One example of the implementation of private sector management style is the 
introductions of private sector pay and working conditions models in the public sector.
166
  
Public units are forced to maintain are stricter budget discipline and by actively searching 
for more cost-efficient ways of delivering public services, costs are to be kept at a 
minimum.
167
 “Hands-on” management is linked to the idea of the manager having more 
freedom to manage. This implies more active control by visible top managers and freedom 
to use discretionary powers.
168
 The move towards measurable standards implies more 
explicit standards of performance in terms of range, level and content of services to be 
provided.
169
 Output measures are controlled through pre-set output measures, rather than 
on an ad-hoc basis with “orders of the day”.170  
     
Lapsley neither interprets Hood’s list as being intended to be normative, nor meant to be a 
pamphlet for reform. Rather, it should be viewed as a reflection of the events in the UK in 
the 1980’s. It is impossible to exactly pinpoint when NPM actually begun. Hood places 
NPM in an international context, and identifies the UK as pacesetter for NPM reform.
 171 
 
German scholar Gernod Gruening offers in a 2001 article a similar list based on later 
literature on the subject.
172
These are: Budget cuts privatization, contracting out, user 
charges, vouchers, competition in the public sector, “Freedom to manage”, the separation 
of politics and administration, decentralization, accountability for performance, techniques 
of performance measurement and improved accounting, strategic planning and changed 
management styles and personnel management systems and incentives. 
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3.3 Criticism of NPM  
Around the turn of the millennium European authors on NPM started challenging and 
rejecting the reforms and ideas of NPM.
173
Axel van den Berg provides an interesting 
critique of public choice theory in NPM.
174
 Van den Berg claims that the application of 
public choice theory to public administration is part of a larger movement aiming at 
applying economic theories to all social sciences.
175
  
Van den Berg focuses on public choice theorists’ relationship to the markets as the solution 
to the problem of the “ever expanding” public sector.176 Public choice theory sets its point 
of origin in assumptions of human behaviour. The foremost interest of voters is to gain as 
much as possible from the vote they cast.
177
 Voters are “rationally ignorant”, i.e. well-
informed of only those issues that personally affect them.
178
 Politicians are seen as 
entrepreneurs seeking power, and who will “pay” voters in public services to stay in 
office.
179
 Similarly bureaucrats will try to maximise the size of their own agency in the 
process of increasing their own benefits.
180
 Lobby groups are seen as rent seekers who try 
to obtain privileges and protection from the government.
181
 By starting from these 
assumptions the result will be that the public sector will grow uncontrollably, leading to 
waste through unnecessary bureaucracy which drains the taxpayer’s purse and increases 
the deficit.
182
 Politicians will align themselves with powerful lobbies that can provide them 
with the resources to get re-elected and to maintain the benefits they derive from holding a 
public office.
183
 Lobby groups will “buy” policy that is beneficial to them such as tax rules, 
subsidies and favourable regulation.
184
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In the words of van den Berg describing public choice theory “[t]hus, politics effectively 
become a market in which powerful actors exchange favours at the expense of the 
powerless majority”185.  
The response by public choice theory is that, assuming human nature will remain the same, 
limiting the role of government is the sole effective remedy.
186
 Van den Berg concludes 
that the unanimous response in public choice literature, as to who should replace the 
retiring public sector, is the private sector. 
187
Van den Berg, however, asks the question of 
how we can be sure that the selfish interest which leads to destructive results in the public 
sector will not lead to the same results if the private takes over some of the tasks of the 
public sector.
188
 Van den Berg’s criticism relates to the fact that public choice theorists do 
not compare existing government run programmes to private sector alternatives but instead 
they assume that private alternatives automatically will be more efficient.
189
 
 According to Van den Berg it is as if the public sector is the only source of problems, 
whereas public choice disregards markets problems such as collusions between 
enterprises.
190
 Further, van den Berg points to the fact that markets are almost never 
perfectly competitive, that there might exist monopolies and harmful oligopolies, as well as 
principal-agent problems in the private market.
191
 The reason for the lack of an equally 
critical inquiry into the private sector is according to van den Berg that the comparator is 
the perfect market that only exists in textbooks.
192
 
Pauline Dibben and Paul Higgens write that “NPM reforms imply changes to both the 
internal working of the public sector and to external relationships.”193 The author consider 
it problematic that NPM reforms are implemented without regard to the local context in 
which implementation takes place and that some groups who are already advantaged will 
benefit more from NPM reforms, and whether disadvantaged groups might actually 
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become more marginalised.
194
 The authors argue that NPM reforms have their ideological 
base in neo-liberalism and that NPM have general animosity towards the provision of 
service by state monopolies.
195
  
The authors examine the implications of marketization. Although the most extreme case of 
marketizations involves the full privatization of state assets, the more common form is the 
introduction of private sector culture values and practises.
196
 The difference between the 
private and the public sectors are however often underestimated. Significant differences are 
attitudes towards risk taking, accountability and the distinction between client and 
citizen.
197
 One of the features of the public sector that distinguishes it from the private is 
that it mistakes by officials, working in a very public setting, are not tolerated by the 
public. Such mistakes cannot be outweighed by massive profits.
198
 Unlike in the private 
sector where company officers ultimately are accountable to stockowners, civil servants 
are accountable to both politicians and the public.
199
 Furthermore, unlike clients, citizens 
cannot choose a different service provider of government service if they are dissatisfied.
200
  
Partnerships between the private and the public sectors may function as function as an 
alternative to outright privatisation. Depending on the nature of the partnership the 
influence of government on the provision of services may vary.
201
 The result can be the 
creation of a so called quasi-market. Such a market can be operated through a public 
procurement mechanism where the government purchases services from the market such as 
in the case of health care in certain situations.
202
 The quasi-market is signified by the 
purchaser/provider split where the government acts as purchaser and the private sector, or 
an organizationally separate public sector unit, acts as the provider of services. 
203
 The 
public sector still maintains control of funding through taxation.
204
 In the view of the 
authors’ the paradox of these quasi-markets is that they require regulation to be set up.205 
Additionally, regulation usually requires a supervising regulator to enforce rules and 
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punish violators, which amounts to increased bureaucracy. Public bureaucracy is replaced 
by contract bureaucracy.
206
 
Dibben and Higgens view critically the way managerialism shapes the workforce. Linked 
to microeconomics, managerialism focuses on measuring performance of employees.
207
 
According to the authors the introduction of performance measures in order to ensure 
accountability leads to an increase in stress among public sector workers.
208
 However, the 
authors argue that there is tension between the controls to ensure accountability and 
managerialism’s move towards a more entrepreneurial public sector.209 Coming out of the 
public choice theory, bureau-maximising was considered an issue. Microeconomics and 
managerialism provided an answer to the problem. By breaking up public monopolies and 
allowing alternative service provides competition was introduced into the public sector 
with the intention on bringing about more efficiency.
210
  
Because the introduction of alternative service providers leading to more efficiency is 
based on microeconomic models which do not always function according to theory, 
managerialism was needed to introduce make microeconomic models work in practise.
211
 
It is believed that by making a distinction between operational and strategic level that 
efficiency gains will occur.
212
 The authors claim that the twin use of microeconomics and 
managerialism seem have a neutrality about it, however, they claim that the 
microeconomic and managerialist discourses are hostile towards the  traditional notion of 
the public sector as a “good employer”.213 Under microeconomic discourse the monopoly 
position is seen as negative, and under managerial discourse interference and control is 
seen as something positive. The conclusion is according to the authors that the introduction 
of economic models of competition will negatively affect public sector personnel.
214
 The 
authors argue that tighter controls lead to a more pressure on public sector workers which 
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supposedly will lead to a better result for citizens. Questions have been raised regarding 
the validity, reliability and consistency of performance measures.
215
  
As previously mentioned, some of the criticism relating to NPM relates to the alleged 
redefinition of the citizen as nothing more than a consumer. NPM is concerned with 
involving members of the public in the decision-making process.
216
 However, the private 
sector being used as a model, the citizen is usually viewed as a consumer. A problem with 
this approach identified by the authors is that it doesn’t take into account citizens with 
fewer resources.
217
 Such groups have difficulties voicing their concerns compared to other 
groups with stronger resources and in areas such as public health, safety and social work 
this might lead to competition between different customer groups.
218
                      
 
         
4. Public services in Union law: Services of General Economic 
Interest 
4.1 Public services and Union law 
4.1.1 Public services in the Member State and their development in EU law 
The concept of public service is a diverse concept which has historically been defined in 
different ways in the European countries.
219
 Its definition has been dependant on the 
development of society, tradition, culture, institutions, social movements and the relation 
of force structured to it.
220
 In attempting to create a unified European definition of public 
services the term services of general economic interest has been developed.
221
 According 
to Bauby there is often confusion regarding mission, objectives, finalities and organisation 
of public services.
222
 In other words; how; why; with what result and by whom should a 
public service be provided? Bauby writes that there are two different concepts of public 
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services. There is a functional concept, emphasising the objectives and finalities, and an 
organic concept, assimilating public services to the entity providing them.
223
 
 The “public” in public services is sometimes understood as the meaning that a task is 
undertaken by a public body, whereas a public service mission can be provided by a 
private actor.
224
 Another aspect is that different levels of government within a state may 
apply different systems. At national, regional and local level service provision can be of a 
market or non-market nature, the providers may be of different legal nature, corporation, 
public entity or association, and doctrines or concepts may be more or less formalized.
225
 
The French legal concept of public service is formalized, whereas the concept is not 
formalized in Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands.
226
 Bauby, however, writes that despite 
national differences there are unitary aspects to public services in all Member States. Some 
activities should not be subject to competition and market rules but to other specific rules 
with shared objectives. The objectives are the right to basic services and goods, such as 
education, health et al, promote the common interest of a community and to take into 
account long term interests for future generations through e.g. sustainable development.
227
 
These values are according to Bauby at the centre of the system of values characteristic to 
all member states. 
4.1.2 The Evolution of EU law and public services 
The power to regulate public services was to a large extent in the hands of the member 
states. De Cecco writes that internal market law had left the area of public service alone 
and primarily focused on obstacles to the free movement of goods and the anticompetitive 
conduct of undertakings. This however changed as internal market law “infiltrated areas in 
which had previously not been characterised as markets and became subject to EU 
economic law. The role of competition law was instrumental of liberalisation was 
instrumental.
228
 Freedland argues that this spillover effect was a result of a change in the 
division of social and economic organization and activity within the Union relating to the 
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clear division between public and private sector within the Member States.
229
 Public 
services and public utilities were clearly part of the public sector. During the first decades 
of the existence of the Union the Member States relied on this division and had created a 
regulatory system around this binary system. Freedland argues that within Union law a 
field of public services law
230
, separate from public and private law, was created which he 
attributes to two factors.
231
  
First, the reconceptualization of the divisions of the sectors of the economy started in the 
1980’s with the movement towards privatization and liberalization (which has been 
discussed previously). There was, however, a movement back towards the public sector 
relating to the demand of recognition of the public service interest. The pressure of these 
two movements on the boundary between the private and the public sector caused the 
boundary to disintegrate or at least create a third public service sector. Within this sector 
the kind and degree of regulation would be different from other the purely private and the 
purely public sector. Freedland’s argument is that this is the reason for the recognition of 
both the public service sector on both Union and Member State level.
232
  
The other reason was a change on EU level which was distinct from the development in 
Member States. This relates to the relationship between the Union and the Member States 
and the creation of the internal market and its aims. Freedland’s argument is that where the 
Union was created for the purpose of free and competitive markets and the conceptual 
pillars on which the Union rested was based on these values. The public sector was of the 
Member States whereas there was to be a European private sector.  
On the one hand there was change within the Member States towards more neoliberal 
policies. Freedland writes that “this threatened to created private-sectors of de-regulated 
trade competition which would be more fiercely neo-liberal than was readily compatible 
with the [Union] model”233. With the nearing of the completion of the Single market the 
Union needed other bases of self-legitimization than free trade. Freedman argues that these 
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were the reasons why the Union acquired an enhanced capacity for public interest 
regulation. However, with this new problems have come up such as the clash of Member 
States with Union rules in trying to preserve the integrity of their public service sectors or 
trying to protect the integrity of their liberalized sectors from Union rules.
234
 It is in this 
context Freed land places SGEIs.             
4.2 The legal basis of services of general economic interest 
4.2.1 Article 106 
In the original EEC Treaty
235
 the objective was to eliminate obstacles to trade but lacked 
any objectives relating to the harmonisation of public services in the member states.
236
 The 
intention was to embrace economic integration through a “Common market” instead of 
direct political integration.
237
 The EEC reinvented the concept of public service as SGEI, 
constituting derogation from fundamental economic policy provisions of the EEC.
238
 In 
order not to confuse the member states as to the meaning of “public service”, as there was 
a different meaning in Germany and France, the new concept was introduced.
239
 
The original text was as follows: 
1. In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant special or exclusive 
rights, Member States shall neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in 
this Treaty, in particular to those rules provided for in Article 12 and Articles 81 to 89.  
2. Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or having the character 
of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to the 
rules on competition, insofar as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in 
fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must not be affected to such an extent 
as would be contrary to the interests of the Community.  
3. The Commission shall ensure the application of the provisions of this Article and shall, where necessary, 
address appropriate directives or decisions to Member States.  
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Prior to the Lisbon treaty what is now Articles 106 and 93 TFEU and were the only basis 
for SGEIs in the treaties.
240
 Between 1957 and 1986, when the European Single Act came 
into force, there was consensus that member states were the responsible for defining, 
organising, implementing and financing its services of general economic interest according 
to their own national traditions, and there was almost no integration regarding public 
services.
241
 During this time article 106 was interpreted as allowing derogations from the 
community rules, in particular the rules on freedom of movement and competition, subject 
to the derogation being justified and proportionate.
242
 Public monopolies were subject to 
sporadic litigation regarding their anti-competitive effects, during this time.
243
  
The Single Act of 1986, which, amended the Treaty of Rome, did not contain any changes 
to the concerning SGEIs.  However, with the introduction of the single market, the 
European institutions were given the task to implement the four freedoms and to realize of 
the single market, which included the aim of creating an internal market for services.
244
 
During the time of the single act liberalisation programmes were enacted in the member 
states followed by liberalisation on EU level.
245
 Simultaneously public sector reforms were 
undertaken in a large number of the member states. Universal service obligations were 
introduced, requiring companies in the liberalized sectors to provide certain services to 
certain groups of consumer, such as the disabled, and to provide services in remote 
areas.
246
  
According to Bauby, the consensus at that time limited services of general economic 
interest to the four freedoms of movement, communications, energy and transport and key 
infrastructure networks.
247
 Bauby names this the start of the Europeanization of public 
services. He writes that the strategy was “[t]o use the arms of the treaty, developed since 
1957, (competition, free trade) to break frontiers and improve efficiency of often 
inefficient services”.248 
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Bauby lists several reasons for this development which he views as essential changes of the 
1980’s and 90’s. The reasons were “[r]apid technological changes, internationalisation of 
economies and societies, diversification and territorialisation of needs, questioning burdens 
and efficiencies of public services, the strategies of major industrial and financial service 
groups, the development of the influence of the neo-liberal theories and the virtues of 
competition”.  
Debate on Article 106 was sparked after some landmark decisions by the CJEU in the early 
90’s.249 There was fear that EU law would cause liberalization and privatisation, especially 
from public sector trade unions and political allies.
250
 Some of this fear was offset by some 
of the landmark cases of the early 90’s.  During the time after the enactment of the Single 
European Act there was debate on how SGEIs should be regulated, whether it should be a 
case law driven approach or a regulatory approach.
251
 In an analysis of the Commission’s 
soft law
252
 on SGEIs Neergard concludes that the Commission has never been the driving 
force in setting up secondary law legislation on SGEIs and that the Commission has 
prevented legislative proposals from being drafted.
253
 
Article 106 provides a “particular regime” for revenue producing monopolies and 
undertakings granted special rights in relation to the other provisions of the treaty.
254
 It 
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contains a general rule and an exception, regarding SGEIs.
255
 Both the rule and exception 
are subject to supervision by the Commission.
256
 Article 106(2), which is the focus here 
must, be viewed in the context of paragraphs (1) and (2). As Baquero Cruz points out these 
provisions are not independent norms but must be read in relation to other norms of the 
Treaties. Their substance will therefore be determined by the content of other provisions. 
According to Baquero Cruz paragraph (1) enshrines the principle that private and public 
undertakings must be treated equally.
257
 Article 106(2) states that: 
Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or having the character of 
a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to the rules 
on competition, in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, 
of the particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as 
would be contrary to the interests of the Union. 
Its scope is defined by the concepts of the notion of economic activity, “undertaking 
entrusted with a service of a general interest” and by the notion of obstruction.258 The 
Article is both addressed to Member States as well as the undertakings themselves because 
of the public nature of the task performed by them.
259
 Baquero Cruz’s interpretation of the 
nature of Article 106(2) is that: “[it] appears not to be a justification nor an exception, but 
rather a binary– or switch–rule that establishes the conditions for the applications or non– 
application of the Treaty with regard to situations involving undertakings entrusted with 
the operation of services of general economic interest.          
4.2.2 SGEIS in the Lisbon Treaty and Article 14 TEU  
 
When the Treaty of Amsterdam came into force services of general economic interests 
were referred to as a part of the common values of the Union, unlike it previously had 
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been.
260
 The definition of services of general economic interest was however more general 
than legally specific.
261
  In Bauby’s view the Amsterdam treaty of 1997 contained several 
elements which pointed towards the birth of a concept of a European concept of a service 
of general interest.
262
 The Amsterdam treaty had the potential of for taking better care of 
and legitimising public service missions even if most of the provision continued to be 
subject to the priority of competition rules.
263
 Sauter, however takes a more sceptical view 
of its significance and refers to the French Senate calling the Article a “consolation 
prize.”264 Buendía Sierra argued that Article 16 EC “does not modify Article 86(2) but 
rather reaffirms the logic behind the provision.”265 Baquero Cruz argued that the Article 16 
EC did not amend Article 106(2) but rather served as an element in the interpretation. In 
BUPA the GC referred to Article 14 TEU in its ruling, giving it relevance for the case law 
on SGEIs.
266
  
With the Treaty of Lisbon Article 16 EC was amended. SGEIs were placed in Article 14 
TFEU. The new provision contained a provision on competence for and Article 14 TFEU 
is now a clear and unchallenged legal basis for secondary legislation.
267
 The Article 
emphasizes the economic and financial conditions relevant to the mission of SGEIs.
268
  
Article 14 TFEU 
Without prejudice to Article 4 of the Treaty on European Union or to Articles 93, 106 and 107 of this Treaty, 
and given the place occupied by services of general economic interest in the shared values of the Union as 
well as their role in promoting social and territorial cohesion, the Community and the Member States, each 
within their respective powers and within the scope of application of this Treaty, shall take care that such 
services operate on the basis of principles and conditions, particularly economic and ﬁnancial conditions, 
which enable them to fulﬁl their missions. The European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of 
regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish these principles and set 
these conditions without prejudice to the competence of Member States, in compliance with the Treaties, to 
provide, to commission and to fund such services. 
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Added to the Treaty of Lisbon was Protocol 26 on Services of General Interest which has 
the same value as the Treaties.
269
 
 
Protocol (No 26) on Services of General Interest 
The High Contracting Parties, wishing to emphasise the importance of services of general interest, have 
agreed upon the following interpretative provisions, which shall be annexed to the Treaty on European 
Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: 
Article 1 
The shared values of the Union in respect of services of general economic interest within the meaning of 
Article 14 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union include in particular: 
• the essential role and the wide discretion of national, regional, and local authorities in providing, 
commissioning and organising services of general economic interest as closely as possible to the needs of the 
users; 
• the diversity between various services of general economic interest and the differences 
in the needs and preferences of users that may result from different geographical, social 
or cultural situations; 
• a high level of quality, safety and affordability, equal treatment and the promotion of universal access and 
of user rights. 
Article 2 
The provisions of the Treaties do not affect in any way the competence of Member States to provide, 
commission and organise non-economic services of general interest. 
 
Unlike earlier treaties the, the text not only mentions SGEIs, but also so called non-
economic services of general interest, NESGIs.
270
 According to the protocol the Union 
does not have competence over these services. The definition of an economic service is of 
course dependent on how the CJEU interprets the protocol. 
4.2.3 Article 36 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of  the European Union 
When the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union was introduced in 2000, 
services of general economic interest were included in Article 36. Since 1 December 2009 
the Charter has had the same legal status as the treaties according to Article 6 TEU.  The 
article states “[t]he Union recognises and respects access to services of general economic 
interest as provided for in national laws and practices, in accordance with the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, in order to promote the social and territorial 
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cohesion of the Union.” Before its entry into force Prosser wrote that Article 36 reinforces 
the view that the Article represents the basis for developing a European concept of 
citizenship rights.
271
 Writing before its entry into force Baquero Cruz stated that the 
introduction of Article 36 Charter would not change much.
272
    
In 2004 the Commission published a White Paper on services of general economic 
interest.
273
 The paper expressed the views of member states that had crystallized in the 
debates on SGEI’s arranged by the Commission.274 The conclusion of the paper was that 
“[t]he division of tasks and powers between the Union and the Member States leads to a 
shared responsibility of the Union and the public authorities in the Member States but 
detailed definition of services to be provided and delivery of those services  remain the 
responsibility of the Member States.”275 Bauby writes that the paper created a doctrine that 
was reinforced with Article 14 TFEU and Protocol on 26 on Service of General Interest of 
the TEU and the TFEU.  
Jääskinen views Article 36 Charter in the light of the new constitutional setting on Lisbon, 
in which the “social market economy” is an objective. The Charter recognizes rights such 
as education which could motivate the introduction of SGEIs. Although Jääskinen agrees 
with the argument that the Charter did not bring about any new rights in the field of SGEIs, 
he still argues that the importance of a binding constitutional document should be 
underestimated. In Jääskinen’s opinion the role of fundamental rights does not boil down 
to a distinction between those that confer rights enforceable in court to individuals and 
others labelled as programmatic or declaratory.
276
 At the moment of writing Article 36 
Charter has not been invoked by the European courts.  
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5. SGEIs in the European Courts: 106(2) applied 
5.1 Economic activity  
In this chapter I will outline the case law on Article 106(2) relevant for SGEIs in the field 
of State aid. After Altmark
277
 it was unclear what the role of Article 106(2) was. However, 
in BUPA the GC ruled that the first Altmark requirement is brought in line with the case-
law of Article 106(2). It is therefore relevant to review the case law in the context of State 
Aid. First, as the Court noted in BUPA, the degree of control of Member States SGEIs will 
vary depending on the division of competence between the Union and the Member State. 
Thus, in cases where the Member State has more competence, the review of the 
Commission will be restricted to a review of “manifest error” instead of a global review.278 
In the context of the first Altmark criteria SGEIs are subject to certain requirements. The 
SGEI mission must be entrusted by a public authority; it must be universal and 
compulsory. Additionally a Member State must give reasons to why there is a need of an 
SGEI mission and why it must be distinguished from other interests.
279
   
The most fundamental requirement for the application of Article 106(2) is the requirement 
that the service at issue constitutes an economic activity.
 280
 As stated by Protocol 26 to the 
Lisbon Treaty, the Union does not have competence in services of a non–economic general 
interest. Furthermore the Treaties are not applicable to non–economic activities in the field 
of competition.
281
  
In Höfner the CJEU had to consider whether employment procurement services constituted 
economic activity. The question concerned the employment procurement state monopoly 
in Germany. The CJEU argued that the fact that a task was carried out by a public authority 
did not make it any less of an economic activity, and referred to the fact that this activity 
was on many occasions performed by private undertakings.
282
 This could mean that the 
limits of markets set by Member States plays no role whatsoever.
283
 Nistor describes this 
as the CJEU testing whether an activity could be conducted by a market, a situation which 
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was repeated in Ambulanz Glöckner
284
.
285
 However, the CJEU does not seem to have 
stopped applying that test. Baquero Cruz writes that based on AOK Bundesverband
286
 the 
general rule is that when Member States chose to exclude the markets from a certain sector 
the CJEU does not apply the potential–economic–activity test of Höfner.    
In Eurocontrol the CJEU held that an international organization charged with the task of air 
navigation services for which it charged airlines fees did not conduct an economic 
activity.
287
 The CJEU held that the tasks were closely connected to that of a public 
authority. The decision set out the criteria of nature, aim and rules to which the activity is 
subject. The CJEU held that the task of the authority were dissociable, whereas in other 
case it has.
288
 In Albany the CJEU considered whether a pension fund was conducting 
economic activity.
289
 The CJEU found that the pension scheme did not contain sufficient 
amounts of elements of solidarity to be considered a non–economic activity. The benefits 
depended on the financial result of the investment instead of being fixed. Additionally, 
there were exceptions to the requirement of mandatory membership.
290
   It is hard to 
distinguish between social and economic activities and what is often decisive is the legal 
framework regulating the activity.
291
  
Nistor lists as important factors of the concept of economic activity the social function, the 
solidarity principle, the lack of intention to make profit, the level of state control, whether 
the activity takes place on an upstream or downstream market and the presence of 
economic elements.
292
    Baquero Cruz in this regard writes that “[an activity] is economic 
because the rules to which it is subject do not completely shield it from competition on the 
part of private undertakings. It would not be economic, however, if those rules were 
framed in such a way that no private undertaking would pursue it under those 
conditions.”293            
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5.2 The procedural and minimum requirements for SGEIs  
In order for there to exist an SGEI mission there, that mission needs to be entrusted by an 
act of public authority and it needs to be clearly defined.
294
  The first requirement relates to 
the connection of the SGEI mission to the state, in separating it from a private interest 
whiles the second requirement, distinguishes an SGEI mission from general regulation.   
The provision of the service in question must, by definition, assume a general or public 
interest. Thus, SGEIs are distinguished in particular from services in the private interest, 
even though that interest may be more or less collective or be recognised by the State as 
legitimate or beneficial
295
 In that context the Court has held that the collective management 
of intellectual property rights by a private organisation were not in the general interest even 
though the interest was collective and these services were recognized.
296
  
The mere fact that the national legislature, acting in the general interest in the broad sense, 
imposes certain rules of authorisation, of functioning or of control on all the operators in a 
particular sector does not in principle mean that there is an SGEI mission
297
 The general or 
public interest on which the Member State relies must not be reduced to the need to subject 
the market concerned to certain rules or the commercial activity of the operators concerned 
to authorisation by the State.
298
 In other words, there is difference between general 
regulation and specific task entrusted to undertakings.   
In the concept of public authority is not only included regulation, but also public service 
concessions.
299
  It is irrelevant whether the SGEI is being provided by a public or private 
entity.
300
 The entrustment of an operator entrusted with a SGEI mission must not 
necessarily be connected to special or exclusive rights but all undertakings can be entrusted 
with a SGEI mission.
301
 The reason is that there is a difference between the special or 
exclusive rights and the SGEI mission. The grant of a special or exclusive right to an 
operator is merely the instrument, possibly justified, which allows that operator to perform 
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an SGEI mission.
302
 Therefor SGEI missions can be granted to all undertakings in one 
market.
303
 This is a specification of the main rule which separates the SGEI missions from 
general regulation.        
The service must be universal and compulsory. The universality requirement does however 
not mean that a SGEI must be correspond to a need common to the whole population or 
that it must be provided throughout the entire territory of a Member State.
304
 SGEIs with a 
limited material scope, territorial scope or with a limited group of users, does not call its 
status as a SGEI into question.
305
 This rule may seem contradictory, but as the CJEU has 
pointed out it is essentially about limiting the freedom to compete of an undertaking.
306
 
The compulsory nature of a SGEI means that operators are required to provide this service 
on the market to anyone who wishes to take advantage of it.
307
 In situation where 
undertakings are granted special or exclusive rights, this service obligation is seen as the 
counterpart to that. The exclusive or special rights are connected to the additional costs of 
providing a service in situations which might not be financially viable.
308
 In a situation 
where all undertakings are entrusted with such a right the counterpart may be the 
obligation to provide it to all those who request them. However, undertakings may still be 
awarded a minimum level of business freedom.
309
 These elements separate SGEIs form 
services which are provided under complete freedom, and are thus separate.
310
        
5.3 The measures tested by the courts  
Out of the case law on Article 106(2) a proportionality test has been developed which 
scrutinizes measures which somehow infringe on Treaty articles. The proportionality test is 
used to assess whether the restriction is linked to the SGEI mission and whether it is 
necessary and proportionate to fulfil that mission. In a State aid context, the proportionality 
test will be “translated” to be applied to the compensation of the SGEI as to ensure that 
there is no overcompensation. In BUPA
311
 this third Altmark requirement was linked to the 
proportionality test. Sauter writes that as Article 106(2) is an exception it must be 
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interpreted strictly and that the burden of proof is with the party that invokes it, the 
Member State or undertaking.
312
 The principle of proportionality is a general principle of 
Union law and there are two variations of it.
313
 There is the less restrictive test “manifestly 
disproportionate” and the strict test of “least restrictive means”.314 The first test requires 
that the measures are prima facie suitable and the second test requires that it is the least 
restrictive of all measures. The distinguishing factor on when the tests are applied is the 
competence of the Union in a specific policy area.  
Sauter argues that this distinction was shown by the CJEU in Fedesa and Others
315
. In that 
case regarding a directive in the area of the Common Agricultural Policy the CJEU held 
regarding the principle of proportionality that in an area in which the Union legislature has 
discretionary power the control of proportionality is limited controlling if a measure is 
manifestly disproportionate.
316
 Applied to Member States Satuter argues that this indicates 
that in areas in which the Member States have competence the proportionality test must be 
restricted to controlling whether a measure in manifestly disproportionate.
317
 
Sauter argues that this position was confirmed by the CJEU in Corbeau
318
, Almelo
319
 and 
Ambulanz Glöckner
320
. Corbeau and Amelo have been interpreted as strengthening the 
case for state intervention in the liberalized sectors.
321
 In Courbeu the Belgian postal 
monopoly was challenged. According to the Belgian criminal code it was an offence to 
engage in the same type of economic activities to which the Belgian postal services had an 
exclusive right. The CJEU was asked whether such a restriction was compatible with 
Article 106(2). To begin with the CJEU held that the Postal service had been awarded 
exclusive rights under 106(1) and was responsible for carrying out an SGEI, which 
justified the restriction of competition due to the exclusive rights. The question the CJEU 
then turned to was the degree of restriction necessary for the Postal service to provide the 
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SGEI.
322
 The CJEU’s analysis of the implications of a service obligation was that in order 
for the undertaking to operate in economic equilibrium, the undertaking was required to 
offset losses in less profitable sectors, in which it was required to operate by law, with 
profits made in profitable sectors. Introducing competition would in the CJEU’s view 
create the risk that undertakings not bound by such a service obligation would focus their 
operations on the more profitable sectors, leaving the Postal service unable to cross-
subsidies its operations in less profitable sectors, due to competition in other sectors.
323
 
However, the CJEU further stated that the restriction of competition must be necessary in 
order to maintain the economic equilibrium and that any additional restrictions not relating 
directly to the performance of the SGEI would not be justified.
324
  
Sauter views the significance of Corbeau from the proponents’ point of view to be that the 
CJEU was ready to accept the argument exclusive rights and cross-subsidisation could be 
acceptable in the context of an SGEI, in order to ensure the financial stability of the 
operations of a universal postal system.
325
 From this point of view the significance that of 
Amelo was that a regional electricity distributor was charged with a universal service 
obligation was accepted as providing services of general economic interest.
326
  
Bauby’s view on the significance of  Corbeau and Almelo, is that  the CJEU reaffirmed 
that the article 106(2) “provides that undertakings entrusted with services of the with the 
operation of services of general economic interest may be exempted from the application 
of the competition rules contained in the Treaty in so far as it is necessary to impose 
restrictions on competition, or even to exclude all competition, from other economic 
operators in order to ensure the performance of the particular tasks assigned to them.” 
According to Bauby the CJEU recognized that services of general interest may fall under 
other objectives, missions, and forms of organization than the general law of 
competition.
327
 Baquero Cruz considers the test applied in Corbeau did not even constitute 
a proportionality test in the strict sense but rather a necessity test. He considers that 
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Corbeau tipped the balance between market and non – market interest in the shape of 
SGEIs to the side of SGEIs.
328
 
In Commission v Netherlands
329
 were the CJEU held that the test was not whether the 
application of treaty provisions threatened the survival of the undertaking, but rather 
whether the application obstructed the performance, in law or in fact of the special 
obligation entrusted to it.
330
 It sufficed to show that that, in the absence of the exclusive 
rights, it would not be possible for the undertaking to perform the particular tasks entrusted 
to it, defined by reference to the obligations and constraints to which it is subject.
331
 The 
CJEU held that it follows form Corbeau that the conditions for the application of Article 
90(2) are fulfilled in particular if maintenance of those rights is necessary to enable the 
holder of them to perform the tasks of general economic interest assigned to it under 
economically acceptable conditions.
332
 The reference to Corbeau is the “economic 
equilibrium” test.333  
In Albany the CJEU clarified the test as requiring that it is either not possible to perform 
the task defined by reference to the obligations and constraints to which it is subject, or, the 
task cannot be performed under economically viable conditions.
334
 It seems as if the CJEU 
accepts that showing the risk of loss in case the exclusive rights were withdrawn is 
sufficient to prove the necessity of the exclusive right in order to perform a task of general 
economic interest. Baquero Cruz states that this ruling confirmed the direction taken in 
Corbeau.
335
 The message on Commission v Netherlands was according to Baquero Cruz to 
be found in the concept of reconciling the aims of the Member States in using undertakings 
in the public sector to pursue policy aim with the interests of the Union.     
In Commission v Netherlands the CJEU also held that, contrary to the opinion of the 
Commission, that the Member State is not under an obligation to show that no other 
conceivable measure could enable to be performed under the same conditions.
336
 In other 
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words, the Member State only has to show that in the absence of the measures, the 
provision of the SGEI would be possible or not possible under economically viable 
conditions, not that the measures are the least restrictive of competition. However, the 
measures should be limited to achieving the aims of the SGEI only. Baquero Cruz bases 
his argument on the necessity test on this reasoning by the CJEU.
337
 
In evaluating the case law on SGEIs Baquero Cruz writes that the CJEU has chosen a less 
restrictive approach to the proportionality/necessity test in order to not eschew the 
democratic process and impose policy choices due to a strict interpretation of this test. As 
Baquero Cruz notes, a version of the test in which the CJEU would impose stricter 
requirements, i.e. the least restrictive measure test, would greatly minimize the margin of 
appreciation for Member States. The same reasoning can be seen in BUPA where the GC, 
referring to Commission v Netherlands held that cannot question the validity of the legal 
system of private health insurance. Baquero Cruz notes that the European courts’ 
approaches to proportionality have created a very flexible concept.
338
      
6. State aid    
6.1 Regulation of State aid in EU law  
In this chapter I will briefly review the rule on State aid law in the EU. The review will is 
brief as the focus of this thesis lies elsewhere. The rules on State aid in Articles 107–109 
TFEU form part of the framework of EU competition law. These rules are applicable to 
private undertakings, public undertakings and Member States. Under these rules the EU 
institution and in particular the Commission are granted power to supervise subsidies, 
which in the legal context of the treaty may be qualified as State aid, given to industry by 
Member States. The general rule is that State aid which distorts competition and affects 
trade between Member States is prohibited. However, subsidies qualified as State aid may 
be accepted, or to use the language of Article 107, be found to be compatible with the 
internal market. In such a case the undertaking which has received the aid avoids the 
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obligation to repay the illegal aid. State aid may be found compatible on grounds relating 
to economic, regional, social and cultural concerns.
 339
  
The granting of subsidies relates to the role of the State in the economy. From an EU law 
point of view the basic starting point in the relationship between state and market in a State 
aid context is Article 345 TFEU which states that “the Treaty shall in no way prejudice the 
rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership.”340 In addition Article 
173 TFEU provides that the “EU and Member States shall ensure conditions necessary for 
the competitiveness of EU industry exist. While the Article is neutral towards public or 
private ownership it opposes dominance which can occur in a situation of public 
ownership. It also opposes the granting of a beneficial position to firms in the case where 
competition may be distorted.
341
 Specifically, the aim of Article 107 is to prevent trade 
between Member States from being affected by advantages granted by public 
authorities.
342
 In providing a general definition of state aid Wyatt and Dashwood refer to 
the definition given by the CJEU in Denkavit
343
 as a general definition of State aid
344
:  
The decisions of member states by which the latter , in pursuit of their own economic and 
social objectives , give , by unilateral and autonomous decisions , undertakings or other 
persons resources or procure for them advantages intended to encourage the attainment of 
the economic or social objectives sought .  
Article 107 contains rules on the conditions to identify State aid and the situations in which 
such State aid may be compatible with the internal market. It sets out rules on the basis of 
which compatibility is to be judged.
345
 In addition to the prohibition in Article 107(1) 
paragraph (2) contains mandatory and paragraph (3) discretionary exceptions. Paragraph 
(2) lays down the qualifications for situations in which an aid must be declared compatible 
with the internal market, whereas paragraph (3) lays down the qualifications for situations 
in which the situation requires assessment weighting the negative aspects with the positive 
aspects of the aid measure.
346
 The power to review aids is regulated under Article 108 
which gives the Commission and the EU Courts the right to assess what constitutes aid and 
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what the conditions for compatibility with the internal market is. Paragraph (1) grants the 
Commission power of review; paragraph (2) regulates the Commission’s power to declare 
aid illegal and the Council’s power to declare aid compatible with the internal market. 
Paragraph (3) imposes on Member States an obligation to   National courts lack the 
competence to declare aid compatible with the internal market.
347
 However, in certain 
situations     
According to the article 107(1) “any aid granted by a Member State or through State 
resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by 
favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it 
affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.”  
The central question in State aid law is what qualifies as aid. As can be seen from the 
article there is no definition what aid is, instead the article defines situations in which an 
aid is not compatible with the internal market. There concept of when an aid is 
incompatible has been developed by the CJEU together with the Commission.  There are 
four prongs to the state aid test which are laid down in article 107(1). The prongs of the 
test are cumulative.
348
  
The measure must confer and advantage on the recipient, the measure must originate in the 
member state or through state resource, the measure must threaten to distort or distort 
competition and it must have an effect on inter-state trade.
349
 Raitio writes that in case law 
these criteria are not always easily distinguishable from each other differentiated, which 
results in different criteria being applied in different circumstances.
350
 State aid cases 
might have market freedom connotations which will bring about public policy aims as 
justification for the national measures.
351
   
6.2 The State aid test under 107(1)  
When assessing whether an aid confers a benefit on the recipient, it as this point not 
relevant to assess the rationale for the aid, that only becomes relevant once it has been 
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established that an aid exists.
352
 The essential point is whether a measure confers an undue 
advantage on the recipient and whether it affects the markets.
353
 According to Siikavirta 
the central feature of state aid law is the benefit conferred.
354
 As an effect of such a benefit 
the recipient will have an advantage over its competitors on the market.  The measure does 
not have to be a positive benefit, such as subsidies, but can also be a negative one which 
mitigates charges an undertaking would normally bear
355
, such as the supply of goods and 
services at a preferential rate
356
, a reduction in social security contribution
357
 or a tax 
exemption
358
.
359
 General measures of economic policy will not be classified as aid.
360
 This 
will however be discussed later in detail, as well as the definition of aid when the state is 
an owner of a company and which has posed some problems relation to the definition of an 
advantage.
361
  
Article 107(1) states that the must be “granted by a member state or through state 
resources. To be considered state aid, no direct “aid” must to be granted as long as the state 
uses regulatory power.
362
 The advantage must directly or indirectly originate in state 
resources to be regarded as an aid.
363
 This rule has been difficult to apply in practise and 
has led to problematic situations.
364
 In early case law the CJEU was not coherent in its 
interpretation of the state resources criteria.
365
 The current interpretation of state resources 
is twofold.
366
 First the CJEU interprets whether there has been use of state resources and 
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then whether these resources have been transferred.
367
 However, in some cases the transfer 
of resources did not need to be shown.
368
 As is typical in EU law the concept of state is 
understood in a broad sense.
369
 This means that the origin of the advantage may be a 
central, regional or local member state authority.
370
  For a measure to constitute aid it 
needs to be shown that the state exercised actual control over the undertaking and took part 
in adopting the measure.
371
 A measure can therefore be considered aid if it originates from 
a body, regardless of its public or private nature, that has been set up or designated by the 
state.
372
 In situations where the state bears no costs there is no aid.
373
 
According to Raitio, the CJEU has taken a narrow view of what constitutes state 
resources.
374
  The narrow view was taken in Ladbroke Racing
375
 and PreussenElektra
376
 
and confirmed in UTECA and Aiscat. The first case dealt with a French state owned 
gambling company arranging horse racing. The company had been using unclaimed 
winnings primarily to cover social costs and excess sums were transferred to the state. 
After a legislative amendment the unclaimed winnings were used as redundancy benefits to 
former employees. The CJEU held that the determining factor was that if the funds had 
been continuously within the control of the state the measure would be considered aid 
regardless of whether the funds are permanent assets of the state or not.
377
 PreussenElektra 
dealt with a regulatory benefit scheme for producers of certain types of renewable energy. 
Germany had imposed purchase obligation at a minimum fixed-price on distributors to act 
as an incentive for producers of renewables. The CJEU held that in this case the measure 
did not constitute aid as the resources were not state resources transferred to companies. 
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Raitio is of the opinion that there is consistency in the CJEU’s reasoning as the factor that 
separates these two cases is the state resource criteria.
378
 
De Cecco writes that the question of the use of state resources had lacked a clear answer 
during decades and that the cases Sloman Neptun
379
, Kirsammer–Hack 380 and Viscido381. 
The cases all concerned derogations from generally applicable employment law.
382
 The 
first case regarded a provision allowing ships registered in Germany to hire non-EU 
workers under less generous conditions, the second case regarded exemption from unfair 
dismissal laws regarding SMEs. The third case regarded fixed-term working contract 
legislation which favoured the Italian Post Office.
383
 In these cases the CJEU held that as 
no state resources were used there was no aid. De Cecco writes that PresussenElektra 
further consolidated and extended this line of case law.
384
 According to De Cecco the 
response to PreussenElektra is on one side that it was a welcome restriction to the 
expansion of the concept of aid, and on the other side that is was too formalistic an 
approach enabling member states to circumvent the state aid rules through regulatory 
design.
385
 
State attribution was also considered in Pearle
386
, which Raitio views as a clarification of 
PreussenElektra and Ladbrokes. Pearle concerned a Dutch, quasi-public, trade association 
board for skilled trades who had, by the request of its member trade organisation for 
opticians, required the members of that organisation to pay for an advertisement campaign 
to the benefit of all opticians. The CJEU held that such a measure does not fall under 
article 107(1) as the funds cannot be attributed to the state. The same line of reasoning was 
confirmed in CIDEF
387
 which concerned a French agricultural trade organisation which 
imposed a compulsory levy to be used for similar purposes as in Pearle.  
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The CJEU has followed the same approach as in PreussenElektra in subsequent case 
law.
388
 In UTECA
389
 the question asked to the CJEU regarded whether an obligation on 
television channels to use a certain percentage of their yearly profits to pre-finance 
European made films in any of the official languages of Spain. In practise this meant that 
most of the financing went to the Spanish film industry.
390
 Once again the CJEU held that 
the measure did not constitute state aid as the funds did not come from the state. 
391
 The 
reasoning of Ladbrokes and PreussenElektra and was summarized in Aiscat.
392
 In Aiscat
393
 
the CJEU highlights the distinction between aid given by a member state and aid from state 
resources. The CJEU held that 107(1) does not imply that any aid or benefit constitutes 
state aid regardless of whether it is financed by the state or not, but that it should be 
interpreted as meaning aid given directly by the state and by a private or public body set up 
by the state.
394
  
According to article 107(1) the aid must be directed towards “certain undertakings or 
certain goods”.395 This requirement demands that the measure be specific.396 Measures that 
are not specific do not constitute state aid which implies that general economic policy 
measures do not fall within the scope of article 107(1).
397
 Drawing the line between a 
general economic policy and a specific state aid can be difficult especially in 
circumstances where the measure is being disguised as a general support or restructuring 
programme.
398
 The intent of the measure is not relevant to the assessment of state aid.
399
 
Measures such as the lowering of social and pension costs may constitute aid if the 
measure is not general enough but in favour of certain undertakings.
400
 The concept of aid 
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includes in addition to positive benefits also negative ones such as the lowering of fees 
otherwise demanded.
401
  
The definition of specificity is whether a one undertaking or a sector of the economy 
benefits more than other companies from a state measure than others does in a way that is 
discriminatory.
402
 An example of a measure that does have a differentiated effect on 
recipients is tax measures which benefit all undertakings.
403
 Differentiated value added tax, 
different tax treatment based on the legal form of a company and differences based on the 
tax system do not constitute state aid as long as they are not selective and the authorities do 
not have discretion in these matters.
404
 In Adria – Wien Pipeline the CJEU had to answer 
the question whether a rebate on an energy tax paid to certain undertakings was considered 
aid under 107(1). The rebate was only paid to undertakings that produced goods, not for 
example to those who provided services. The CJEU held that for the measure not to be 
considered aid it would have to make no distinction between any undertakings within a 
national territory when conferring a benefit.
405
 The CJEU considered the measure to 
constitute aid under 107(1) as it selectively benefitted a certain group of undertakings.  
In the Azores
406
 case the CJEU had to consider whether a tax measure benefited 
undertakings based on the Portuguese territory the Azores islands in the Atlantic. The 
question at hand was whether a tax reduction, specific to the Azores, in relation to the 
generally applicable corporation tax, constituted state aid under 107(1). The Portuguese 
legislation allowed for the local parliamentary body to adopt a tax reduction, which the 
local parliament had taken advantage of.  The CJEU held that when dealing with taxation 
the reference framework is important, i.e. what tax rule to compare with in order to see 
whether the measure is selective.
407
  
However, that framework need not be the entire geographical area of the member state so 
that a measure conferring an advantage in only one area of the member state would not 
automatically be considered selective.
408
 The test laid down by the CJEU was whether the 
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regional body would be sufficiently autonomous in relation to the central government. The 
regional body must play a fundamental role in defining the political and economic 
environment in which the undertakings operate.
409
 In this case however it was found that 
the Azores were not autonomous enough and the measure was considered specific and not 
general.
 410 
According to Raitio criteria of selectivity was specified in British Aggregates.
411
 The case 
dealt with a levy on new aggregates as opposed to recycled ones. The aim of the measure 
was to create incentives for the use of more environmentally friendly products. The British 
Aggregates Association had appealed the decision made by the GC.
412
 The CJEU held that 
it is at first necessary to establish whether a measure confers a benefit on one or more 
undertakings within the context of a legal system, in relation to other undertakings which 
are in a legally or factually comparable situation.
413
 Second the CJEU held that measures 
that are selective due to the nature and structure of the overall system of which they form a 
part are not considered state aid.
414
   
6.3 The effect on competition and trade  
As a third condition there is the distortion of competition or the threat of the distortion of 
competition by aid favouring certain undertakings or products.
415
 This condition rarely 
requires a much evidence to be proven in state aid cases.
416
 As Craig and De Burca write a 
subsidy will undoubtedly place an undertaking at an advantage in relation to other 
undertakings and this condition is often an unproblematic issue in state aid law.
417
 
However, as Siikavirta writes, the idea behind state aid law is not that all forms of aid will 
distort competition, and thus should be banned, but that prohibited aid must be separated 
from aid that is compatible with the market.
418
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According to the CJEU state aid law pursues, together with antitrust law, the aim of 
undistorted competition in the internal market.
419
 State aid can be used as a way of 
correcting market failure
420
  reviewing the Commissions position on state aid in the State 
Aid Action Plan
421
 De Cecco writes that avoiding obstacles to productive, allocative and 
dynamic efficiency seems to be the Commission’s central concern.422 De Cecco writes that 
a similar inquiry into the competitive effects of state aid as in antitrust law
423
 is not 
required by the CJEU, even though there has been a gradual increase in the intensity of 
such reviews.
424
 In Philip Morris
425
 the CJEU dismissed an initial attempt to introduce a 
scrutiny of the competition effects of an aid measure.
426
 The CJEU held that it was 
unnecessary to define relevant product and geographical markets and the relationship 
between the beneficiary and its competitors. Instead it was sufficient to show that the aid 
facilitated the increase of the production capacity, and that the measure relieved the 
undertaking of parts of the costs arising from an increase in production capacity which its 
competitors would normally have to bear.
427
 The CJEU stated that “[w]hen state financial 
aid strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings 
competing in intra-community trade the latter must be regarded as affected by that aid”428 
The same reasoning has been frequently used since.
429
 According to Raitio the relevance of 
this case was however that the Commission need only show a potential threat to the 
distortion of competition.
430
 Referring to Italy v Commission
431
 Craig and de Burca write 
that the CJEU will compare the situation of an undertaking before it received the aid with 
the post-aid situation.
432
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According to article 107(1) an aid is incompatible with the internal market in so far as it 
affects trade between member states. In practise this condition will be fulfilled when an 
undertaking engages in trade in other member states or the sector in which the undertaking 
operates in stretches to another member state.
433
 It is often sufficient for an undertaking to 
be active in a sector in which there inter-state trade occurs, even though the undertaking 
itself does not engage in inter-state trade.
434
 The Commission only needs to show that 
inter-state trade will potentially be affected.
435
 Even a relatively small amount of aid or the 
small amount of recipients may affect inter-state trade.
436
 This is likely to be the case in a 
sector where there is strong competition in the sector in which the undertaking operates.
437
 
 
 
7. Financing public services – Altmark and its aftermath 
7.1 Legal approaches to financing Public Services: A background to 
Altmark 
SGEIs find its link to state aid law, and more precisely to Article 107 TFEU through how 
the way they are financed. From a state aid law point of view, because states usually fund 
services of general economic interest, the central issue in SGEIs is the price paid for the 
service.
438
 The case law on the issue of financing SGEIs was for long dominated by two 
sharply contrasting views. These sides where dubbed “the compensation approach and the 
State Aid approach”.439 The CJEU originally took the compensation approach only to 
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reverse it later and to specify it in Altmark. Before Altmark the State aid approach was 
generally favoured by the Commission and the GC.
440
 
The compensation approach was taken in ADBHU
441
. The case concerned the collection of 
waste oil for which the certain undertakings were responsible and received an indemnity. 
Regarding the question of the whether the indemnity was considered an aid measure the 
CJEU held that compensation did not constitute aid under 107(1) but rather a consideration 
for a service.
442
  Advocate General Lenz held that “the indemnities must not exceed annual 
uncovered costs actually recorded by the undertaking, taking into account a reasonable 
profit.”443In opposition to this view the State aid approach holds that the funding of SGEIs 
should fall within the definition of State aid, but also that it should be able to benefit from 
the exemption in Article 106(2).
444
 The benefit of this approach is that Member States 
would be required to notify aid to the Commission and national CJEUs would be bound by 
the standstill obligation.
445
 In other words, SGEI financing would be subject to the control 
of the CJEU and the Commission.   
The position was outlined by the CJEU in Banco Exterior de España
446
 in which the CJEU 
held that a tax measure which exempted a public undertaking from a certain tax, when the 
undertaking was operating in the public interest, would be caught by Article 107(1), 
however, it could possibly be exempted by Article 106(2). AG Lenz wrote on the 
relationship between Articles 106(2) and 107 that Article 106(2) cannot be relied on from 
the outset.
447
 AG Lenz concluded that Article 106(2) should be viewed similarly as to the 
types of aid which are compatible in with the internal market according to Article 107(2) 
and (3).
448
 AG Lenz goes on to cite the CJEU in Italy v Commission
449
  where it was 
concluded that “it must further be observed that the application of article [106(2)] of the 
treaty is not left to the discretion of the member state, which has entrusted an undertaking 
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with the operation of a service of general economic interest. Article [106(3)] assigns to the 
commission the task of monitoring such matters, under the supervision of the CJEU.”450  
This State aid approach was subsequently applied by the GC, which further explored the 
interaction between Article 106(2) and Article 107(1) TFEU in in FFSA
451
 and SIC
452
. 
FFSA concerned a tax concession, which benefited the state-owned post monopoly, La 
Poste in comparison to its competitors. The tax concession was a compensation for 
providing certain universal services such as the presence of post offices throughout the 
entire territory of France. The GC held that the tax measure constituted aid as it conferred 
an advantage.
453
 The GC held that aid which normally would be considered incompatible 
with the internal market may be compatible under Article 106(2). As derogation 106(2) 
had to be interpreted strictly, it was not enough that an undertaking has been entrusted with 
a SGEI; it must also be shown that the application of the treaty provisions would obstruct 
its performance.
454
 
 This approach was later overturned by the CJEU.
455
 In Ferring
456
 the CJEU introduced the 
so called compensation approach. Ferring dealt with wholesale medical distribution in 
France. Distributors of medicines where required by French law be maintain in stock a 
certain amount of pharmaceutical products and to be ready to supply and deliver them 
within a certain amount of time, a so called public service obligation. Partly in order to 
compensate for the PSO the French government implemented a tax which exempted 
wholesale distributors of pharmaceutical products. This tax was challenged by a French 
pharmaceutical company as conferring an advantage upon wholesale distributors and thus 
constitutes aid under Article 107(1). In this case the CJEU concluded that compensation 
for a public service obligation is not State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, 
unlike it had done in FFSA.  
The CJEU based its reasoning on ADBHU
457
. Certain undertakings were required to 
dispose of waste oil. For this service they received a compensation which was equal to the 
costs. In ADBHU the CJEU had considered such a compensation not to constitute aid, but 
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rather a compensation for a SGEI.
458
  In Ferring the same conclusion was made. The CJEU 
held that as a long as the amount of compensation paid to the wholesale distributors did not 
exceed the yearly costs of meeting the PSOs, i.e. that there was a connection between the 
compensated sum and the costs of providing the service,  it was not a question of State aid 
according to Article 107(1).
459
 Subsequently the CJEU applied Article 106(2) alone and 
held that additional costs to the cost of meeting the public service obligation will not be 
considered as necessary to meet the obligation as there is no advantaged conferred.
460
   
De Cecco writes that the significance of this decision was that it moved back the 
compensation issue from the compatibility stage to the threshold stage.
461
 In other words, 
the CJEU assessed whether Article 107(1) applied, not whether the measure was aid 
compatible with the internal market. Such an assessment will goes back to analysing the 
reasons for state aid instead of the effect on competition and possible compatibility with 
the internal market. Instead of, as in the State aid approach, assessing whether a measure 
confers an advantage, the compensation approach directly concludes that in cases where 
undertakings are entrusted with SGEIs there cannot be an advantage since the measure 
compensates for an SGEI. Only if the compensation exceeds the additional costs incurred 
from the performance of the SGEI there is an advantage conferred upon the undertaking.     
Rizza criticises Ferring and the compensation approach negate the function and relevance 
of Article 106(2).
462
 AG Léger who criticized the compensation approach in his opinion in 
Altmark
463
 was of the opinion that Ferring blurred the line between whether a measure is 
categorized as aid and whether the aid is justified.
464
 In his criticism he contends that 
Article 106(2) loses it applicability with the Ferring argumentation. Léger reasons that if 
Article 107(1) does not apply as the measure only compensates a PSO, then Article 106(2) 
has no effect. If there is “overcompensation” the Article 107(1) will be applied to the 
additional costs which exceed the costs arising from the PSO. According to this reasoning, 
Article 106(2) is therefore deprived its effect.
465
 Additionally Léger found it problematic 
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that the role of the Commission as a monitor of was diminished by Ferring. Léger argued 
that since member states according to previous case-law were required to notify planned 
aid measures involving a PSO, the duty to notify would not apply as a measure to 
compensate a PSO would not be considered aid and that it therefor would be no duty to 
notify.
466
  
AG Jacobs echoed this criticism in stating that although both approaches are concerned 
with additional sums of money paid to undertakings with PSOs with the State aid approach 
there is a duty to notify.
467
  According to Rizza the Ferring judgement increased the risk of 
Member States using PSO’s as a means to disguise distortive measures.468 Additionally, 
the Ferring case did not contain any indications on how to assess the equivalence between 
the costs of the PSO and the compensation.
469
  
7.2 A compromise of approaches: The Altmark ruling and Chronopost 
7.2.1 Altmark: The compensation approach with strict requirements  
After Ferring, many national courts sought clarifications on the concept of the 
“equivalence test”, i.e. in the situations in which a state measure would be deemed to 
merely compensate and not confer an advantage on the recipient.
470
 Altmark
471
 provided an 
answer to that question and clarified the relationship between SGEIs and their financing. 
The CJEU appears to have been partially influenced by the Opinion of AG Jacobs in 
GEMO.
472
 In his Opinion AG Jacobs criticized the CJEU for what he viewed as an 
inconsistency in the application of the compensation and the State Aid approach.
473
 After 
having applied the compensation approach the in ADBHU
474
 the CJEU had subsequently 
applied the State aid approach until Ferring
475
 in which it switched back to the 
compensation approach.
476
 AG Jacobs, stating that both approaches had merits to them as 
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well as problems, proposed a compromise between the two approaches, applying the one in 
certain situations and the other in other situations.
477
  
In situations where there was a clear link between the compensation of a PSO, and where 
the contents of the PSO were clearly defined, such as in a situation where public 
procurement has preceded the entrustment of the task, the compensation approach would 
continue to apply. In situations where there was not a sufficiently clear link between the 
state measure and the PSO the State aid approach would continue to apply. AG Jacobs 
used the example of Banco de Exterior de España
478
 in which the measure related to a law 
granting a tax exemption to all public banks. The law did not indicate that the funds raised 
by the tax measure were intended for compensation of a PSO.
479
  The CJEU seemed 
influenced by the approach suggested by AG Jacobs in GEMO but went even further in its 
own reasoning.
480
  
Altmark, a German case, dealt with the public subsidies to transport company, awarded 
with a near exclusive geographical licence, operating local bus lines. The bus lines were 
not profitable and the regional authority granted the bus line operator with a subsidy. The 
legal issues regarded the financing of the PSO. First, the CJEU held that where a state 
measure compensates for services provided by the recipient undertakings, in order to 
discharge public service measures, the measure will not be caught by Article 107(1) and be 
regarded as State aid. The conditions are that the measure does not grant the undertakings a 
financial advantage and that the measure does not put the recipient undertakings in a more 
favourable position that its competitors.
481
 So far the CJEU followed the compensation 
approach. However, the CJEU continued by stating that for a measure not to be caught 
under Article 107(1) four conditions must be met. This approach can be dubbed the refined 
compensation approach
482
 
1) The recipient undertaking must have PSOs to discharge and the PSOs must be 
clearly defined. 
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2)  The parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated must be 
established in advance in an objective and transparent manner.  
3) The compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover the additional costs for 
discharging the PSO. This ought to be done by taking into account the relative 
receipts and allowing for a reasonable profit.  
4) The recipient undertakings discharging the PSO must either be selected through a 
public procurement process, or, if that is not possible, the level of compensation 
needed to fund the discharge of the PSO must be determined by an analysis of the 
costs a well-run undertaking provided with the means to discharge the PSO would 
have incurred.
483
 
Altmark can be dubbed a compromise between the compensation and the State aid 
approaches.
484
 The test created by the CJEU seems to have originated from the test under 
106(2).
485
 The actions of the CJEU in Altmark can be characterized as trying to push away 
the treatment of public service obligations from a formalistic paradigm in 106(2) to a more 
integrative paradigm.
486
 What the CJEU did was that it shifted the focus of the discussion 
regarding SGEIs from the issue of whether a PSO would be qualified as a SGEI and allow 
for derogation from treaty rules.
487
 Instead the CJEU shifted focus to the financing aspect 
of SGEIs through Article 107(1) which implies that the financing of PSOs can be 
accommodated from within state aid law without the formality of a rule/exception 
relationship.
488
 In Müller’s view Altmark should be viewed against the backdrop of the 
relationship between competition and the creation of an internal market and the concept of 
market correction, social welfare and redistribution especially by granting aids.
489
 Müller 
writes that these two concepts are not wholly compatible, but that they are linked through 
the “spill-over effect” of competition law into other fields of Member State policies, 
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thereby restricting their autonomy. This takes place especially in fields which departs from 
the “principle of open markets and free competition”.490   
In relation to the previous 106(2) test the Altmark test is more complex in that it requires 
an economics and accounting analysis, and more rigorous in that there is no need to define 
what the contents of an SGEI is.
491
 The direct connection to Article 106(2) seems to be 
removed, which does not exactly solve the problem of the applicability of the Article 
which AG Jacob had called for. Instead the CJEU uses the concept of a “public service 
obligation. The Altmark criteria can also be characterized as more severe than the test 
under Article 106(2). It requires transparency of the Member states regarding the public 
service obligation, the need to fix the rules on funding in advance, and the assessment of 
the amount of funding needed using the two types of mechanisms in the fourth criteria.
492
 
The four criteria in Altmark were not problem-free. Although the first three requirements 
can be seen as quite straightforward, albeit with some interpretational difficulties the fourth 
criteria left questions unanswered.
493
 The first requirement can be seen as being of a formal 
character and preventing member states from ex-post allegedly imposed SGEIs. The 
second requirement seeks to make sure that no advantage is conferred. This is 
accomplished through the requirement that the parameters for calculating the compensation 
is established in advance and that they are transparent and objective. The problematic issue 
here was that of the implementation and the problems with ensuring that a pre-defined 
methodology of calculating compensation will not necessarily guarantee that no advantage 
is conferred in the future. The third requirement clarified that the compensation provided to 
the undertaking discharging the PSO may not only cover the costs but also a reasonable 
profit. The problematic issue here is obviously the difference between “normal” and 
“excessive” profit.494  
With the fourth requirement the CJEU dictates how the compensation is to be determined 
concretely and provides to options. The public procurement option is in line with the 
policy of the Commission which has considered that a public procurement procedure will 
avoid overcompensation and a distortion of competition. Before Altmark it had not been 
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clear whether a public procurement procedure would automatically eliminate state aid or 
whether it merely med the Aid compatible with the internal market under Article 106(2). 
With the second option the CJEU introduces an approach in which it compares the costs of 
a well-run undertaking with that of the undertaking imposed with the PSO. The can be seen 
as an introduction of the private investor principle which amounts to an efficiency criteria. 
Together with the third criteria this implies that the costs required to discharge the PSO 
will not only have to match the costs, but it will have to be run efficiently, with the 
benchmark being “a well-run undertaking”. Some of the problems with this is approach is 
finding a suitable comparator, as was the problem in the Chronopost
495
, might occur. 
Additionally, the costs of to be compensated are traditionally based on actual costs of a 
specific undertaking and not on a hypothetical market actor. 
7.2.2 The Almunia Package 
In response to Altmark the Commission published in 2005 a set of measures intended to 
clarify the conditions of the Altmark test, which was named the Altmark or the Monti-
Kroes package.
496
 The package contained an amendment of the Transparency directive, a 
de minimis Decision on aid to SGEIs, and a Framework on the application of Article 
106(2) to the funding of SGEIs.
497
 The Decision was created to alleviate worries regarding 
the retroactive application of the Altmark criteria by exempting from notifications 
measures that met the first three criteria of the Altmark conditions.
498
 The framework was 
intended for situations in which neither the Altmark nor the Decision requirements were 
applicable and it provided guidance on the applicability of Article 106(2) TFEU.
499
 The 
amended Transparency Directive required all undertakings that received compensations for 
the discharge of PSOs and also carried out other non-PSO related tasks to keep separate 
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accounts.
500
 This package was part of the more comprehensive Action Plan for State 
Aids.
501
 The reform was a part of the Lisbon strategy
502
 and its aim was to aid towards 
improving the competitiveness of European industry and creating sustainable jobs, and to 
contribute better to social and regional cohesion and environmental protection.
503
 The 
Commission intended to set up a more “economic approach” towards State aids.504  
In 2011 the Commission created a new package as a result of some of the grey areas in the 
Monti-Kroes package.
505
 The new packed which was dubbed the Almunia package 
contained a Communication, a Decision, a Framework and a proposal for a de minimis 
Regulation in the field of SGEIS.
506
  
In the Communication the Commission explains how it interprets the Altmark criteria 
when assessing whether a State measure is to be considered to be considered to fall outside 
the scope of Article 107(1) as laid down in Altmark.
507
 In its De minimis Regulation the 
Commission lays down rules for de minimis aid granted to undertakings providing a 
service of general economic interest providing a service within the meaning of Article 
106(2).
508
 State measures meeting the de minimis criteria will be considered by the 
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Commission to comply with the Altmark criteria and therefore not constitute Aid within 
the meaning of Article 1017(1) and be exempt from notification under Article 108(3).
509
  
The Decision lays down rules for when a State measure that does not meet the Altmark 
criteria, and therefore is caught by Article 107(1) but can be declared aid compatible with 
the internal market through the application of Article 106(2).
510
 These criteria apply to aid 
of a maximum of € 15 million granted during a certain period of time.511 The consequence 
of meeting the criteria laid down in the Decision is that the aid does not have to be notified 
to the Commission.
512
 The requirements regarding compensation of social services of 
general economic interest as defined by the Decision are less strict.
513
 The Framework sets 
out the “principles” that apply to public service compensation which constitutes aid in 
situation where the aid is not covered by the Decision 2012/21/EU, i.e. where the measure 
neither constitutes aid under the de minimis rules nor under does it exceed € 15 million.514 
Such aid is subject to notification under Article 108(3). The principles of the Framework 
are applied by the Commission when assessing whether the aid is applicable with the 
internal market under Article 106(2).
515
 
Consequently, the relationship between the measures of the Almunia package is that the 
Commission first will assess whether a measure of compensation for a public service 
obligation constitutes State aid according to its Altmark based requirements in the 
Communication. If those requirements are not met the measure may constitute State aid, 
which may or may not be compatible with the internal market. If the measure meets the de 
minimis requirements of the Regulation it will not be considered State aid. If the sum of 
the measure is up to € 15 million it might be considered State aid compatible with the 
internal market. If, however, the aid measure does not meet the requirements of the 
Decision it will be assed under Article 106(2) regarding its compatibility with the internal 
market by using the principles laid down in the Framework. Depending on the outcome of 
that analysis the aid may or may not be declared compatible with the internal market.
516
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7.2.3 The Commission’s guidance of the Altmark criteria  
The Commission points out that in the absence of EU rules on SGEIs Member States have 
a wide discretion in defining SGEIs. The task of the Commission is to assess whether there 
has been a manifest error in the definition of the SGEIs.
517
 The Commission considers that 
in situations where there an activity is already is provided satisfactorily and under 
conditions, such as price, objective quality characteristics, continuity and access to the 
service, consistent with the public interest, as defined by the State, by undertakings 
operating under normal market conditions, it is not appropriate to entrust an undertaking 
with a PSO.
518
 This approach seems to give a Member State considerable discretion as it is 
up to defining the public interest and when it is met. As an example of a manifest error 
given by the Commission is a situation in the broadband sector in which private investors 
have already set invested in broadband infrastructure network which provides “adequate” 
access, setting up a parallel broadband network infrastructure should not be a SGEIs.
519
 
The Commission uses the market as benchmark and state intervention becomes the 
exception. The question that requires interpretation is of course when a broadband network 
can be considered to provide adequate access? Do the requirements relate to speed and 
geographical coverage? Additionally the Commission points out those SGEIs should be 
addressed to citizens and society as a whole.
520
  
Regarding the entrustment of the PSO the Commission is of the opinion there may be 
variations in the manner in which an undertaking is entrusted with a PSO. The 
Commission is more interested in what the act of entrustment contains. According to the 
Communication the act must contain (a) the content and duration of the public service 
obligations; (b) the undertaking and, where applicable, the territory concerned;(c) the 
nature of any exclusive or special rights assigned to the undertaking by the authority in 
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question; (d) the parameters for calculating, controlling and reviewing the compensation; 
and (e) the arrangements for avoiding and recovering any overcompensation.
521
  
Concerning the parameters of calculating the compensation the Commission emphasizes 
that there does not have to be a specific formula used as long as long as it is clear what 
how the compensation is being determined.
522
 Where the undertaking is offered a 
reasonable profit the calculation of that profit must be specified in the entrustment act. The 
Commission specifies that because overcompensation is prohibited any selection 
mechanism of undertakings to be entrusted with a PSO be ensure that no 
overcompensation takes place.
523
 Reasonable profit means a return on capital that would be 
required by a “typical” company considering whether or not to provide the SGEI taking 
into account the level of risk. The risk may depend on the specific sector. Reference can be 
made to public service contracts granted under competitive conditions such as public 
tender. When there is no undertaking to compare with a comparison can be made with 
undertakings providing SGEIs in other Member States or undertakings in other sectors, 
taking into account the specific characteristics of each sector. The Member States may use 
incentive criteria relating to quality of service and increase of productivity. However, 
efficiency gains may not be achieved to the detriment of the quality of services.
524
 
 Regarding the fourth Altmark criteria the Commission specifies the award criteria 
regarding the “lowest price”. The requirement is the lowest economically advantageous 
offer, including social and environmental objectives as long as they are closely related to 
the subject matter of the service offered.
525
 Regarding environmental requirements the 
Commission refers to its guidance on “green” public procurement. Qualitative criteria are 
allowed to be a part of the assessment. In situations where a public tender would not lead 
to the most economically advantageous outcome, in situations where there is no true 
competition on the market, when certain undertaking possess vital infrastructure or 
intellectual property, a public tender will not automatically ensure that the fourth criteria is 
fulfilled.
526
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The Commission specifies the criteria of “well-run undertaking”. The aim is to make sure 
that the high costs of an undertaking are not taken as a benchmark.  Member States should 
apply “economically recognized criteria representative of satisfactory management”.527 
Showing profitable result will not be enough as the Commission holds that it must be taken 
into account that in sectors with undertakings entrusted with SGEIs their financial result 
may be influenced by market power or sectorial rules.
528
 When assessing the undertakings 
the Member States must use national and international accounting standards. Member 
States may also use qualitative criteria to assess the undertaking. Undertakings must 
always comply with these criteria. When analysing cost structures the size and sector of the 
undertaking must be taken into account.
529
 
7.2.4 The Commission’s case law after Altmark: A strict application of Altmark 
In his analysis of the post-Altmark Commission case law Max Klasse concludes that the 
Commission has interpreted the Altmark criteria strictly and as a consequence it has 
regularly been held that the criteria have not been met.
530
 As Klasse writes of the 
Commission’s approach: “[W]hile Altmark allows for a self-assessment by Member States 
of public service compensation, the assessment of whether compensation that qualifies as 
State aid meets the requirements for compatibility under Article 106(2) TFEU or other 
Treaty provision is a matter for exclusive competence of the Commission.”531 By the 
Commission’s strict interpretation the Member States in practise often fail to meet the 
Altmark requirements, bringing the public service compensation within the reach of Article 
107(1). Subsequently the Commission declares the compensation compatible with the 
internal market through Article 106(2) or 107(3). The conclusion drawn by Klasse is that 
“the Commission has seized control the Commission has seized control over Member 
States’ spending in the context of what they consider to be a public service remit.”532 The 
fourth Altmark criterion has proven to be difficult. The Commission has interpreted it is 
such a way that it seems like the criteria can only be met if the provider is selected based 
on a competitive tender. Even in such cases it seems like the Commission may not accept a 
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correctly conducted public procurement procedure as the compensation may fail the 
necessity test, the least cost criteria. This has led to situations where arrangements such as 
incentives for the operator to increase efforts, seek improvements to quality, attract more 
customers and attain additional revenues, require notification.
533
  
Klasse writes that the Commission has compelled parties to agree to a more or less fixed 
margin of profit. The second alternative of the fourth Altmark criteria has been unclear (a 
typical, well-run undertaking). With the absence of additional guidance there have been 
problems as to the foreseeability of the results of the test, which has created legal 
uncertainty. Member States have had difficulties conducting self-assessments. Problems 
with finding a suitable benchmark undertaking can arise because the undertaking providing 
a SGEI operates in a sector without private undertakings and the differences in public 
service tasks may not make a cross-border comparison possible. Therefor the comparison 
may have to be done with a fictional undertaking.
534
            
7.3 Altmark amended? 
7.3.1 Chronopost: Lex Specialis? 
Chronopost was a case in which a verdict was given a few weeks before Altmark. The two 
cases shared some similarities but Altmark provided no guidance as to how to apply the 
fourth Altmark criteria. The French postal service, La Poste, had a legal monopoly on 
certain postal services and La Poste had an exclusive right to providing the services in 
question. La Post was also charged with public service obligations such as provision of 
services in the entire French territory.  Unlike the main postal network, the express service 
sector was open to competition. La Post owned a subsidiary, Chronopost, operating in this 
competitive market. A competitor argued that the fees paid by Chronopost for use the 
postal network in its business constituted State aid as the fees did not correspond to the 
amount the amount a private undertaking having set a similar postal network would charge 
another undertaking for using its services.  
The CJEU of Justice, however, held that such a benchmark was incorrect. . In the words of 
the CJEU: “in the absence of any possibility of comparing the situation of La Poste with 
that of a private group of undertakings not operating in a reserved sector, normal market 
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conditions, which are necessarily hypothetical, must be assessed by reference to the 
objective and verifiable elements which are available[…]”535 The CJEU concluded that La 
Poste was an undertaking entrusted with SGEIs to the benefit of all users in the French 
territory to be provided at certain fixed prices. As such La Poste would have had to create a 
postal network for this purpose which was not in line with a purely commercial purpose. 
Such a network would never have been created by a private undertaking. The CJEU 
therefore held that if the costs payable by Chronopost to La Post were equivalent of the 
costs of providing the service then there was no State aid.
536
 More specifically, there was 
no State aid if “first, it is established that the price charged properly covers all the 
additional, variable costs incurred in providing the logistical and commercial assistance, an 
appropriate contribution to the fixed costs arising from use of the postal network and an 
adequate return on the capital investment in so far as it is used for SFMI-Chronopost's 
competitive activity and if, second, there is nothing to suggest that those elements have 
been underestimated or fixed in an arbitrary fashion.”537 
Von Danvitz puts Chronopost in perspective and views it as a matter of cross-subsidisation 
with its origin in the Corbeau
538
 case.
539
 As explained the CJEU held in Corbeau that 
106(2) TFEU allowed for an undertaking with a legal monopoly, entrusted with an SGEI to 
cross-subsidies its business operations to ensure economic equilibrium. In Corbeau Article 
106(2) TFEU was applied in relation to Article 102 TFEU as the legal monopoly itself was 
questioned. Von Danvitz writes the perception of cross-subsidisation as a subject to state 
aid law is a relatively new one and it is closely linked to the process of liberalisation of 
certain sectors. There is a risk of state resources originally intended to fund SGEIs used in 
order to cross-subsidies business operations in a competitive environment.
540
  
The question has been raised of whether Chronopost and the fourth Altmark criteria can be 
reconciled.
541
 In other words, why wasn’t the well run undertaking test applied to La 
Poste? However, the CJEU held that exclusion of competition was not allowed for other 
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than services associated with the provision of the SGEI.
542
  Such a test would have enabled 
a closer scrutiny of the cost structure of La Poste.  Bartosch argues that there is no real 
conflict between Altmark and Chronopost as there in Altmark were comparators (other bus 
line operators) whereas in Chronopost there were none.
543
 Bartosch considers Chronopost 
to be the exception to the rule provided in Altmark for situations as the one mentioned. 
Von Danwitz sees the Chronopost ruling as a way to balance the interests of the general 
ban of State aid in Article 107 and the necessity of ensuring workable conditions for public 
services under Article 106(2) and that there should be no hierarchical relationship between 
them.
544
 Agreeing with Bartosch Müller writes that Altmark is Lex generalis and 
Chronopost is Lex specialis distinguished on the basis of the difference underlying facts, 
especially the market structure.
545
 Bartosch writes that from that perspective “Chronopost 
shows the limitations that the application of this general framework has in cases where for 
the services provided no market exits and, consequently, no comparable private operator 
can be found the cost structures of whom can be used as suitable benchmarks.”546 It seems 
clear in the light of the foregoing arguments that Chronopost must be seen as an exception 
to Altmark.    
7.3.2 BUPA 
BUPA
547
 is a landmark case that applied the Altmark criteria in a more lax way than in 
Altmark. The BUPA ruling also shed light on the relationship between Article 106(2) and 
the first Altmark requirement by combining bringing them in line. The case dealt with 
private health insurance in Ireland and is together with Chronpost one of the most 
significant developments since Altmark. 
BUPA was a British health insurance company which sought annulment of a Commission 
decision regarding the Irish risk equalisation scheme (RES) created by in order to equalize 
losses by of health insurance providers due to a high risk profile. The Commission held 
that the RES did not constitute State aid as it was compensation for a SGEI mission. At the 
time of the decision Altmark had not been given yet due to which the Commission applied 
Ferring. 
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 The Irish market for health insurance was deregulated in 1994. Prior to that, there had 
been one provider of private medical insurance (PMI), with exclusive rights, the VHI. The 
PMI was an additional insurance which offered coverage on top of the general social 
security scheme which had limited coverage for person for other than persons in poor 
social situations. This meant in practise that the majority of the Irish population was not 
wholly covered by the statutory social security scheme and purchased additional PMI.  
One of the aims of the Irish health care system was to ensure solidarity between 
generations. With the aim of achieving this certain obligations were imposed on all the 
insurers such as open enrolment, community rating and lifetime coverage. Generational 
solidarity was to be realized by preventing, to a certain extent,  insurers form differentiated 
pricing for the same product based on age or sex, resulting in higher prices for young 
customers and lower for older, thereby subsidizing the older clients.  In order to keep the 
market stable and prevent what in practise was new entrants into the market from targeting 
young and healthy clients with low risk profiles, thereby leaving all the high risk customers 
with the former monopolist, the RES was set up to compensate insurers with a high risk 
profile. Insurers with low risk profiles would compensate insurers with high risk profiles 
through monetary transfers through the RES. BUPA, an entrant on the market following 
the deregulation of the marker that had paid to the RES, argued that the RES served as a 
mechanism for providing State aid to VHI, the incumbent.  
The obligations which were imposed on all insurers consisted in open enrolment prohibited 
insurers from declining consumers that fulfilled the requirements form being granted 
insurance, community rating banning direct discrimination based on age and sex in pricing, 
and lifetime coverage meaning that once insurance was granted it expired upon death. 
As an introductory remark it should be stated that the GC held that, unlike in Altmark
548
, 
the subject matter of the case dealt with an area where the Union almost has no 
competence, namely the organisation of health care.
549
 Adding to this the Court 
emphasised the significance of Article 14 TFEU in that it a reflection of the division of 
power between the Union and the Member States. On the definition of SGEIs the Court 
held that “there is no clear and precise regulatory definition of the concept of an SGEI 
mission and no established legal concept definitively fixing the conditions that must be 
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satisfied before a Member State can properly invoke the existence and protection of an 
SGEI mission, either within the meaning of the first Altmark condition or within the 
meaning of Article [106(2) TFEU].”550 Referring to case law the Court subsequently held 
that in scrutinizing the nature and scope of a SGEI mission defined by a member state, the 
role of the Commission’s, review, and the review by the Court itself is restricted to 
manifest errors.
551
  In doing this the Court tied together the case law of Article 106(2) with 
the Altmark criteria.
552
  
The Courts treatment of the requirements of clearly defined SGEIs, universality and the 
compulsory nature of SGEIs are interesting. Due to the fact that there was no single 
undertaking responsible for providing SGEIs, but that the provision of SGEIs was imposed 
on all actors on the market, the Court had to deal with the question of separating general 
regulation of market activity from the defining what was to be a SGEI. The Court first held 
that a SGEI mission could be entrusted to all actors on a market, basing this on the fact that 
an SGEI mission is conceptually separate from an exclusive or special right.
553
 Without 
further analysis the Court also asserted that the SGEI mission entrusted to all actors was 
separate from general regulation, against a claim raised by the application. This distinction 
between regulation and a SGEI mission, which is important because without a SGEI 
mission restrictions of treaty provisions cannot be accepted, seems hard to pinpoint 
considering the degree of freedom the market actors had. As the applicant pointed out, the 
insurers were allowed to exclude persons over 65. Additionally, the insurance was not 
compulsory but voluntary.  However, the Court still held that that the requirements for a 
SGEI mission were fulfilled and that a limited material or geographical or personal scope 
of a SGEI mission did not call into question its qualification as a SGEI mission.
554
 
Commenting on the compulsory nature of an SGEI mission the Court engages in a circular 
argument. It held that the compulsory nature means that the service providers are bound to 
provide the services according to the rules governing those services.
555
     
The SGEIs obligations largely consisted of a ban to discriminate based on age or sex. 
However, there was no maximum level for the premiums and differentiated cover at 
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differentiated prices was allowed for different products. The Court did not elaborate on the 
distinction between regulatory activity an  imposing a SGEI mission, it merely referred to 
case law stating that a SGEI mission does not have to be connected to a special or 
exclusive right but can also be assigned to all undertakings.
556
 In reality, there seems to be 
little difference between general regulation and imposing a SGEI mission. The    
As regards the universal and compulsory nature of the SGEI, the GC held that even though 
insurers were not required to grant insurance to persons over the age of 65, this exception 
was not sufficient to deprive the SGEI of its universal and compulsory nature. Instead the 
Court it based its reasoning on the fact that the exception only concerns persons who have 
never had coverage and that the number is likely to decrease a more people apply for 
insurance at an earlier age. In other words the Court conducted a material analysis of the 
situation but accepted that an SGEI does must not be provided to all applicants.
557
 
Analysing the third criteria of overcompensation, the Court held that in light of member 
state discretion in defining SGEIs, and the role of the Commission as reviewing whether 
there was a manifest error the scope of the judicial review would be to check whether the 
Commission had erred in concluded that there was no manifest error.
558
 The Court further 
held that the third Altmark criteria coincide with the Article 106(2) case law on necessity 
and proportionality of SGEI compensation.
559
 The proportionality test is limited to whether 
the discharge can function in economically acceptable conditions.  
In applying the third Altmark criteria the Court first came to the conclusion that the RES 
does not compensate for cost arising from the SGEI obligations. Instead the role of the 
RES is to equalize the burden between. Within the limited review the Court held that the 
legality and of the rules could not be called into question. Comparing the system to that in 
Ferring and Altmark the GC held that the mechanism for compensation was “radically 
different”. For this reason the GC held that the third Altmark in a strict sense was not 
fulfilled. Instead the GC assessed that the RES was consistent with the “spirit and purpose” 
of the Altmark criteria.
560
 The Court considered that the comparing of average risk profile 
to the risk profile of an individual market actor when determining costs to be paid to the 
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RES was sufficient to fulfil the criteria. Because of the characteristics of the system there 
was no need to take into account the receipts from the cost of the operation.
561
 In applying 
the fourth Altmark criteria the Court initially pointed out the close link between the third 
and fourth criteria as the both relate to the costs incurred by the undertaking entrusted a 
SGEI-mission. As with the third criteria the Court held that it was not possible, in the strict 
sense, to apply the fourth criteria, as the compensation was not directly linked to the SGEI-
obligations. The Commission would in applying the fourth Altmark criteria have looked at 
whether the VHI as the recipient. The Court also held that there were sufficient guarantees 
to ensure the system would not be taken advantage of by deliberately increasing costs in 
order to manipulate the risk profile with the aim of being granted RES payments.
562
  
The conclusion of the Court was that all of the requirements of the Altmark criteria had 
been met and that the Commission had not erred in its finding of no manifest errors.      
The Court held that the Member State’s discretion in this area is confirmed by the by the 
lack of competence by the Commission and the absence of a definition in Union law.
563
 
The GC argued that the fact that Union lacks competence in the area of health care was 
allows for a more room to manoeuvre in the definition of SGEIs. In areas which no or 
shared competence this freedom to define is at its greatest, according to the GC, referring 
to the principles of conferral and subsidiarity in Article 5 TEU. In this context the GC 
emphasizes the role of Article 14 TFEU on SGEIs as reflecting the division of power 
between the Union and the Member States.  In interpreting the first Altmark criteria the GC 
seems to bring into the interpretation Article 106(2) as to bring the case law in line.
564
  
7.3.3 Further case law 
The EU courts have interpreted the Altmark criteria around 25 times where a handful of 
these decisions have not yet been published.
565
 In most cases the EU courts simply apply 
the criteria without any closer scrutiny. However, there are cases that are interesting for 
this analysis.  
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In Valmont
566
, a case in which the recipient of what the Commission had held was State 
aid had contested the decision. The applicant Valmont had received subsidies from a Dutch 
municipality which was partly used to build a parking lot. Through what was in the case 
referred to as a “gentlemen’s agreement” the municipality and Valmont agreed on open up 
part of the car park to the public. Because of this, “semi-public” car park the Commission 
had in its decision held that only 50% of the aid would be classified as aid and the other 
half would be classified as compensation. The GC however concluded that the 
Commission had made a manifest error in not applying the Altmark test to review the 
amount that was to be considered compensation and what the costs were for the 
discharging of the obligation.
567
  
The GC had initially held that the Valmont “bore a burden in the public interest”, and with 
this initial conclusion held that the Altmark test should have applied.
568
 Without applying 
Altmark the Commission could not be able to assess whether a benefit was conferred was 
the message of the GC, and consequently the decision was annulled. The GC did not 
conduct a review as thorough as it did in BUPA as Altmark was not applied. An interesting 
point to this case is that the GC did identify what it called a public service burden without 
applying Altmark. This interesting thing about this public service burden is that it had been 
given through a gentlemen’s agreement. It seems that the formal requirements for the 
entrustment of an SGEI can be very low. It should however be pointed out that the GC did 
not conclude that there was an SGEI mission but merely that based on the public service 
burden the Altmark test should have been applied, and that the Commission therefore made 
a manifest error.  
According to Hedder and Holwerda this shows that undertakings may rely on “ill-defined” 
services of general economic interest in order to shield themselves for State aid law and the 
obligation to repay aid.
569
 However, it must be remembered that in this case the GC did not 
conduct an Altmark analysis and there was thus no analysis of the SGEI. It merely held 
that the Commission had made a manifest error. It can be argued that the use of this case is 
limited to situations where the Commission has failed to apply and Altmark and not as a 
definition of a SGEI mission, as that analysis was never made. It was simply held for the 
sake of analysing the case the public service burden was sufficient to trigger Altmark. In 
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that sense it may be more appropriate to conclude that this case was about showing the 
Commission the significance of Altmark.  
Another interesting case is TV2/Denmark v Commission
570
, a joined case, which regarded 
the definition of SGEIs. An applicant in this State aid case which dealt with aid to a public 
broadcaster had question SGEI mission of TV2. TV2, a Danish public broadcaster, 
received its funding partly from licence fees and partly from selling air time for 
commercials. The applicant in this case argued that since TV2 also broadcasted 
programming which was broadcasted by purely commercial networks that programming 
should be excluded for the public service mission and as such could not receive 
compensation.
571
 The Commission should have assessed which programming was public   
service and then compared with the programming of private actors.  The Commission on 
the other refuted that submission by stating that its task was limited to finding manifest 
errors. The GC agreed with the Commission in this case and referred to the discretion of 
Member State in defining the contents of the SGEI mission, which in this context further 
was based on the SGEI Communication
572
 and the Amsterdam protocol on public 
broadcasting
573
.
574
  The GC held that the applicant confused the financing with the 
definition of SGEIs. An SGEI could consist in both the broadcasting of commercial and 
non-commercial content. The Commission had not erred in finding that there was no 
manifest error.           
7.3.4 Defining SGEIs 
It seems that EU law does not provide a definition of the content of a SGEI.
575
  The treaty 
is silent on the content of an SGEI. On the older case law defining SGEIs, such as 
Commission v Netherlands
576
, Ross writes that the CJEU focused more on the conditions 
for applying a introducing a SGEI then the definition itself. However, that changed with 
the introduction of Article 14 TEU and the Commission’s papers on the subject.577  The 
GC made it clear that there is no definition of an SGEI either within the meaning of the 
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first Altmark criteria or Article 106(2).
578
 The GC therefor dismissed the idea that a SGEI 
should be a Union concept. 
579
 In this regard Member States have a wide discretion and 
role of the Commission is limited to finding manifest errors.
580
  Instead the GC reviewed 
the criteria for creating SGEIs.
581
 In Ross’s opinion this creates a tension between the 
previous assertions by the GC that an SGEI is not a Union concept. As previously stated, 
within the definition of universal service, the GC found room for limitations to the scope of 
its application.
582
 Additionally the services could even be offered for profit and that the 
services concerned could be considered as luxury. The GC also clearly rejected the 
Commission’s definition of a SGEI.583 The applicant in BUPA argued that a SGEI must 
fulfil certain requirements laid down by the Commission its Green paper on Services of 
General Economic Interest.
584
 The requirements were universal service, continuity, quality 
of service, affordability, as well as user and consumer protection. However, these elements 
were rejected by the GC.
585
 
In FFSA the GC expressed it clearly that it is not the role of the Commission is not to 
question the political choices made by national authorities in imposing public service 
obligations.
586
 An example of this discretion was is the case of TV2/Danmark v 
Commission.
587
 The Danish legislator had defined the SGEI of a public broadcaster in 
qualitative terms, indicating that the public broadcaster itself could define what kind of 
programming was aired, including programming that “competed” with private networks. A 
qualitative definition of an SGEI, which in allows for the public broadcaster to freely 
decide the content is a good example of how broad the concept is. The airing of any 
programming that was deemed to meet certain qualitative criteria as defined by the 
broadcaster itself was held to be an SGEI.  Compared to for instance Altmark, where the 
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SGEI consisted of well-defined transport services, bus lines at certain routes we can see 
that SGEI can be used by Member States in a variety of ways.  
The difference between Altmark and for instance TV2/Danmark seems to have created two 
different categories of SGEIs. The background to these two distinct categories of SGEIs 
seems to have been clarified in BUPA.  In BUPA the GC held that it was not appropriate to 
apply the Altmark test, but instead to apply the test in the “spirit of Altmark”, in a case 
regarding private health insurance. Referring to BUPA the GC in CBI v Commission
588
 
held that in certain areas Altmark cannot be applied strictly.
589
 Taking into account the 
specifics of the hospital sector, the Genera CJEU stated that when assessing whether to 
apply Altmark strictly or not, it should be taken into account whether a SGEI is provided 
without a commercial interest because it is classified as a SGEI for the reason that its 
existence affects the commercial sector.
590
 In CBI v Commission the GC referred to a 
similar reasoning in SIC v Commission
591
. The case dealt as in TV2/Danmark with the 
financing of public service broadcasting. In that context the CJEU held that “[a]lthough the 
public service of broadcasting is considered to be an SGEI and not a service of general 
non-economic interest, it must none the less be pointed out that that classification as an 
SGEI is explained more by the de facto impact of public service broadcasting on the 
otherwise competitive and commercial broadcasting sector, than by an alleged commercial 
dimension to broadcasting. As is clear from the Amsterdam Protocol, public service 
broadcasting ‘is directly related to the democratic, social and cultural needs of each 
society’.”592 
In other words, when competition is at risk of being distorted because of a not-for-profit 
activity affecting competition, and not because there is risk of overcompensation of an 
otherwise commercial activity (the situation in Altmark) there is reason to apply Altmark 
less strictly. If we are to define SGEIs in relation to the way in which Altmark is applied it 
can be argued that there are different kinds of SGEI and that the definition has been 
affected by EU law since different standards are applied to different types of SGEIs. 
However, this binary division cannot wholly be applied to BUPA as the undertakings 
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discharging SGEIs in that case did have a profit motive and there was a risk of 
overcompensation distorting competition. 
GEMO
593
 provides an interesting example of the definition of SGEIs. Gemo concerned a 
tax payable by certain purchasers of meat such as supermarkets which was used to fund 
carcass disposal services. This disposal services were provided free of charge to French 
farmers. The background to this measure was the outbreak of foot and mouth decease.
594
 
The question at issue was not the compensation for providing the service of carcass 
disposal but rather that farmers benefited from the service being free of charge to them. De 
Cecco points out that Gemo does not relate to the definition of SGEIs but rather this “side 
effect”.595 However, this case can also be seen as the CJEU taking a strict approach on how 
strictly Member States should define the parameters of an SGEI. Had the definition of the 
public service included the provision of the services for free the result might have been 
different. It can also be argued that the GEMO judgement questions the logic of the 
system. If the carcass disposal service, a private undertaking, is to charge farmers for its 
services, what exactly is it the being compensated for? Does this not trigger an Altmark 
investigation regarding possible overcompensation? It that sense can be argued that by 
attacking that services were being provided for free, and thereby distorting the logic of the 
system, the GC did impact on how SGEIs are defined. It seems that the conclusion drawn 
by many others that the definition of SGEIs is truly open. However, as shown above it can 
be somewhat altered by the context, and not all situations provide equal freedom.    
8.  Analysing SGEIs and the Altmark criteria: An impact of NPM  
In this chapter I will analyse the relationship between NPM and SGEIs in a State aid 
context.  At the onset the differences between NPM and SGEIs in a State aid context must 
be emphasized, what they consists of and how it is relevant to this analysis. The difference 
that must be highlighted is the difference in their relation to the public sector. NPM is a 
movement which seeks to make the public sector more efficient, it is a set of ideas based 
on certain assumptions of reality, and on the basis of those ideas policy suggestions are 
made. In other words, liberalization or privatisations are not ends in themselves, but rather 
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means to achieve an efficient public sector. Rules on SGEIs on the other hand function as a 
limit for the rules on, in this specific context, of the Union’s competition policy. Initially it 
can be stated that where NPM sets out to change the public sector, it cannot be known 
prima facie whether rules on SGEIs does the same. For example, in the field of 
liberalization NPM advocates it, whereas SGEI rules have to adapt to it.   
Liberalization and privatisation are phenomena which both NPM and SGEI rules have a 
relationship to. Privatisation and liberalization have been undertaken first at a national 
level, and second at a Union level through harmonized programmes. Furthermore, public 
procurement law a regime within the Union which can be argued to shape the role of state 
in what the State produces itself and what is left to the market.  
Although it has been argued that Altmark increased the scrutiny of the Member State 
definition of SGEIs
596
, De Ceccos assertion that BUPA proves this argument incorrect 
seems to be true.
597
 However, this requires in my mind some further assessment. It seems 
as if though the difference between Altmark and BUPA are, looked at from an NPM 
perspective, is are inherently similar to one of the main points of criticism towards NPM 
namely its relationship to approach to so called public service values. As we can see in 
BUPA, the GC was given the task of reviewing a national private health care scheme. 
Interestingly, the background of the case can be found in a marketization reform of the 
health care market in Ireland. That reform had not did not entail the full application of 
market forces the health insurance market but instead it the Irish legislator had chosen to 
include the protection of certain non-market values, namely generational solidarity. The 
special features of the Irish national regulation of using market solution while at the same 
time protecting other values can also be found in the theme of NPM and its relationship 
with values. The task of the GC in BUPA was therefore to review an NPM reform.  
However, it must be remembered that at the time of the BUPA ruling NPM reforms were 
receiving heavy criticism already and in many countries there were movements against the 
application of NPM to public sector reform. It can be argued that NPM management 
reforms are connected to what Freedland dubbed the concept of public service law.
598
 
What we see here is one of the two elements of the birth of this concept. As was written 
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earlier, Freedland contributed this development to the liberalization and privatization in the 
Member States. Whereas Freedland stated that the one of the reasons to the birth of public 
service law would be to prevent regulatory competition, it seems that in the case of BUPA 
there was actually the opposite occurring, namely a foreign entrant on the market claiming 
to be losing profit because of structure of the national system.  
Another conclusion to be drawn regards the relationship between NPM and State aid law is 
the opening of markets and the increase of the use of State aid law as the tool to by 
undertakings to remedy perceived benefits conferred. As De Cecco writes the connection 
between State aid law and SGEIs is relatively new.
599
 The shift of SGEIs towards the area 
of State aid law can be explained by the opening of markets to competition, which 
arguably can be seen as an NPM reform. The legal instrument to use for an undertaking 
wishing to challenge an incumbent will is different when exclusive rights have been 
dismantled due to marketization and privatization reforms. As seen in chapter 6, the early 
case law relating to SGEI was often in connection directly to Article 102. With the 
increasing use of public procurement to choose which market operator would perform an 
SGEI this also meant that the “old” legal instruments partly lost their relevance?  
Therefor we can see that NPM, and in particular marketization reforms played a part in 
shifting the focus of SGEI from the areas of antitrust. That is not to say that these areas 
completely have lost their relevance, but it can at least be argued that their significance as 
legal instruments have decreased.
600
 In this context it is important to note that it is not 
sufficient in reviewing this development to look at differences in the “culture” of the public 
sector in the Member States.
601
 But wider developments such as EU wide NPM reforms of 
the public sectors must be viewed. There seems to be a tendency
602
 to try to focus on the 
differences of the public service sector in the Member States as a basis for analysis of the 
development of SGEI and State aid law.  
While such differences must not be underestimated it should at the same time not be 
forgotten that there are developments within different Member States as well and these 
developments might also be connected to policy initiatives at an EU level. As Bauby wrote 
the liberalisation schemes on a Union level were preceded by liberalisation schemes on a 
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national level.
603
 With this in mind the development of SGEIs cannot be merely looked at 
through the Member State - Union dichotomy, but broader developments must be taken 
into account.
604
  
As Ross writes, the BUPA case can also be seen in the light of the wider discussion 
regarding the relationship between competition law, in the broad sense
605
, and other non-
competition values.
606
 This debate relates to the issue of whether competition law with its 
primary objective of efficiency can embrace values relating to equal treatment and the 
distribution of resources.
607
 As Prosser writes since the gradual expansion of competition 
law into other fields there has been debate as to what the role of non–market values should 
be. Seen in this light BUPA highlights the importance of non-market values in Union law.      
Ross sees BUPA as the development of social values in Union law. Instead of claiming 
that BUPA was about State sovereignty BUPA can be interpreted in light of the increasing 
significance of solidarity in the Union. Referring to the objective of generational solidarity 
of the RES in BUPA he connects it to the term of intergenerational solidarity introduced by 
the Lisbon treaty.
608
 On the role of solidarity in EU law Boeger writes “[EU] competition 
law steps back where Member States impose solidarity obligations on their citizens, not 
simply out of respect for the role allocation between the [Union] and the Member State, but 
because in a very real sense this role allocation is founded on the idea that those 
obligations are not imposed at all nut have been freely assumed by citizens through their 
participation in their national political processes.”609 In the operational concept of 
solidarity De Cecco sees it as a bond between citizens of Member States, not between 
Member States or Union citizens.
610
  
The BUPA case can be seen as strengthening the view that non-market values are 
strengthened in relation to market values.
611
  Ross argues that viewed from the solidarity 
perspective there is no need for a Union definition of SGEIs “[i]nstead, a re-
conceptualisation of the European Union’s competition rules can produce a subsidiarity-led 
                                                 
603
 Bauby 2011, p. 24 
604
 For a similar argumentation see De Cecco and Syzyak.  
605
 In TFEU the provisions on State aid law and SGEIs are part of Title VII – Chapter 1 – Rules on 
Competition.   
606
 Ross 2009, p. 139.  
607
 Tony Prosser 2005, p. 38.  
608
 Ross 2009, p. 140.  
609
 Nina Boeger: Solidarity and EC competition law, European Law Review, Vol. 32 3:2007, p. 325.   
610
 De Cecco 2013, p. 156.  
611
 De Cecco 2013, p. 156.  
87 
 
case for the effectiveness of SGEIs delivered nationally and locally. The concept of 
solidarity can be found in Article 3 TEU, and a chapter on “Solidarity” in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights on workers’ rights, environmental protection and consumer 
protection. De Cecco finds the operational approach to solidarity in the SGEI.
612
 With the 
solidarity approach in mind De Cecco suggests the following conclusion to be drawn from 
BUPA: “For the purpose of State aid law, SGEIs are, at the current state of development, 
requirements to which Member States ascribe special significance, a significance which the 
EU recognizes and promotes as being a manifestation of its own values clustered under the 
label of solidarity, values to which the EU law attaches no specific prescriptions.”613 The 
exception in this case is the areas in which the Union has legislated.
614
 De Cecco’s and 
Ross’s arguments are in my view supported by TV2/Danmark v Commission where the 
concepts of solidarity and non-market values seem to be further strengthened in relation to 
market values. The GC held regarding public broadcasting highlighted the significance of 
the public service mission’s “cultural, social and democratic functions which it discharges 
for the common good [and has] a vital significance for ensuring democracy, pluralism, 
social cohesion, cultural and linguistic diversity.”615 Similarly the GC followed the BUPA 
approach in the post–BUPA case CIB v Commission when Altmark was applied less 
strictly. 
If this is the conclusion to be drawn is as described what is then the relation between 
solidarity in a State aid context and NPM? I can be arguing that it relates to the concept of 
solidarity as a relationship between citizens of Member States, to be more precise it deals 
with the concept of citizenship. As previously written, NPM has been criticized for 
reconceptualising the concept of citizenship. When the citizen is viewed more as a 
consumer receiving a service, moreover, a service than can be provided through the 
market, the then there is a risk of the solidarity aspect of citizenship to disappear as 
solidarity is the product of citizens coming together to create common policy. In this sense 
it has been argue that the Union engages in activities which are market-making and 
therefor as a disturbance and erosion for national solidarity.  From this point of view it 
seems like the NPM consumer–citizen does not seem to be able to find a home in BUPA. 
Where the NPM consumer–citizen interacts with others on the market, with the market 
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being the bond that brings people together, the “traditional citizen” is linked to other 
citizens through solidarity.   
What about the situations in which Altmark is applied strictly? How is one to interpret 
those situations in the light of the solidarity argument? De Cecco argues that BUPA proves 
that Altmark did not bring about a more intensified review of SGEIs and that it was in line 
with previous case law, instead it highlights the importance of solidarity for the Union.
616
 
How is then the rest of the case law in which Altmark is applied strictly to be interpreted? 
According to De Cecco’s definition of an SGEI there seems to be more freedom in the area 
of “solidarity” and more scrutiny in areas in which the Union has more competence. The 
problem with this approach is of course that the area of solidarity is poorly defined. When 
may solidarity be invoked? Naturally, as was pointed out by the GC itself, the fact that the 
Union has little competence in the area of health plays a role.  
In BUPA it was not only the definition of an SGEI that was at stake but the way they were 
connected to the other Altmark criteria. One must remember in BUPA that the legal issue 
did not merely regard the first Altmark requirements, but also the three others. In theory it 
could have been possible for the GC to accept the existence of an SGEI mission but 
considered that there others were not fulfilled as the RES did not directly compensate for 
an SGEI but rather a structural element of the health insurance system itself, which was to 
share risks equally in for the purpose of generational solidarity. The conclusion to be 
drawn here is that the definition of SGEIs is related to how they are financed, at least in the 
strict Altmark model. The reason for this is that the Altmark test is constructed upon a 
certain concept of how an SGEI is structured. In the Altmark world there are clearly 
definable SGEIs discharged by undertakings, and these can SGEIs can be quantifiable in a 
way that enables compensation to be paid for their discharge.  This concept is limited to 
situations where the services that are performed are quantifiable, which, as previously 
mentioned is largely due to the way 106(2) case law developed. 
 In the Altmark context, the services at issue were transport services, which are easy to 
quantify. The result of a “failed” Altmark test in a situation where the service is easily 
quantifiable and it is provided by one undertaking is that there eventually may be a 
situation where unlawful State aid must be repaid. However, when markets are opened to 
competition and EU law is “invited” in the situation changes.  In a context such as in 
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BUPA where all market actors were imposed with a SGEI and it was difficult to quantify 
cost, a State aid decision would have most likely lead to the entire restructuring of the 
private healthcare system. A strict Altmark application would have had systemic 
applications. Not just is the Altmark decision based on certain parameters regarding the 
nature and financing of a SGEI, but also, due to the logic of State aid, the consequences of 
an Altmark application differs depending on how the SGEI system is constructed. In the 
first situation the consequence is repayment of aid, in the second there are systemic 
implications.  
Essentially, Altmark did define the concept of an SGEI, as it is not only the first criteria 
that establish the existence of an SGEI mission, but the other three that implicitly create the 
framework of how an SGEI should be delivered. This delivery takes place on a market, the 
service can be clearly defined and the provision of the service can be subject to an 
efficiency standard. It is through this analysis that the relationship with NPM materializes. 
The concept of the delivery of a service public service in Altmark is highly shaped by the 
ideas and values of NPM. In Altmark we find the marketization aspect, the quantification 
aspect and the managerialist element in the sense that any organisation can deliver a public 
service as long as they are subject to a strict efficiency scrutiny which is best realized 
through competition. In that sense Altmark also exhibits the limitations of an NPM 
approach as demonstrated by BUPA. Where the lack of the ability to clearly define a 
public service mission, in the context of State aid law, an NPM approach is applied, it will 
push towards market solutions as NPM does not recognize solidarity based values.  
Has the influence of NPM been decreased with the BUPA? Not necessarily. In my view 
BUPA is the exception and Altmark is the main rule. In this regard one must not overlook 
the argument of the significance of Article 14 TEU, Article 36 of the Charter and the SGEI 
protocol to the Lisbon Treaty. However, by looking at the post–Altmark case law we can 
see that Altmark is regularly being applied. That is not to say that there would not be cases 
in the future in which the BUPA approach is being applied, but rather that the Altmark test 
seems to be adequate in most situations. To clarify, I bring this argument fourth in 
response to the argument that BUPA shows that there is less scrutiny if the definition of 
Member State financing and entrusting of SGEI missions. Although the scope of 
application of Altmark is limited by BUPA, is still applies in many situations.   
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However, if one is of the opinion that the Altmark test is appropriate, which it undoubtedly 
from an NPM perspective is, then there is really no change. Due to its relationship with 
state aid law in the SGEI context, NPM should be viewed as a factor in creating the 
framework for public services in the context of what Prosser views as an emerging area of 
public service law
617
, as a separate area of law. It could even be stated that in a legal 
context NPM materializes as public service law, through its views on the public sector. 
Prosser wrote that this sector of law is created when partly when movements for 
privatization and public service values meet, which leads to the accentuation of non-market 
value concepts within competition law which previously have in a separate sphere of 
public law. It is against the background of the rising legal significance of the concept of 
solidarity in EU law the suggestions of characterising SGEIS as necessary only when there 
is market failure. Due to the rise of non–market values, these suggestions made by the 
Commission and others could be viewed as a way of giving a NPM, or perhaps more 
specifically, law and economics definition to them. BUPA and Altmark are very good 
indicators of the process of the birth of the area of public sector law. They contain the 
conflict between market and non-market values.  
As a final remark it can be stated that the argument of NPM leading to overregulation 
instead over deregulation seems valid when looking at the SGEI rules. In a legal context 
this could be translated to legal uncertainty. The field of SGEI law is very complex and is 
connected to many different areas of law and requires extensive knowledge to get a broad 
view of. The clash between deregulated markets and non-market values has created a field 
of complex rules which lack clear parameters for application. Although it can be stated that 
such values as solidarity has been acknowledged by the EU courts, it is still unclear in 
which situations such exceptions might apply.                                   
9. Conclusion: NPM and the birth of public service law  
The relationship between NPM and SGEIs seems to be that NPM reforms were part of 
opening open markets which provided for the applicability of Union law. In the field of 
competition law, the liberalisations of markets led to a shift in the caseload from a focus on 
monopolies to a focus on state aid though the financing of SGEIs. It can be concluded that 
NPM has had an effect on a national level, to which EU law has had to react with new 
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tools. The effect of NPM in an area such as healthcare, in the form of liberalization and 
marketization, has led to Union law to deal with such concepts as solidarity. In this indirect 
way, by forcing Union law, in the application of competition law, to assess situations in 
which non–market values have been present, NPM has been a part of reshaping an area of 
law, or even perhaps created a new area of law, public service law. This has had a negative 
effect on legal certainty and has increased the complexity of regulation. N 
PM reforms have in this sense brought the public sectors of the Member States closer to 
the integration process of the Union. Although NPM has progressed at different speeds in 
different Member States and different policy alternatives have been implemented, through 
its contact with EU law it has in a way affected all Member States. As there at the moment 
still is uncertainty as to how Union law interacts with especially with non–harmonized 
areas of law in which the Member States have competence, there is still an ongoing 
development and this impact of NPM will have to be further studied to see its long term 
effects.                   
  
 
  
   
    
 
